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I. INTRODUCTION
It is the year 2001. The Chicago police know that a large and violent
drug ring is operating out of Slumville, a downtown section of the city.
The gang manufactures drugs, sells them on the streets, and distributes
them to other locations in Chicago and outlying areas. Wary of
electronic surveillance, the group never uses phones or pagers but
instead conducts all of its transactions face-to-face. The city is fed up
with having an illegal drug factory in its midst.
The new chief of police decides to mount an aggressive effort to
close down the gang's operation, but does not have the manpower she
needs to carry out an extensive campaign. Even if she did, she doubts
whether traditional foot and car patrols could safely put a stop to the
gang's activities. The department has recently spent a considerable sum
of money on investigative technology. The chief decides that using the
new gadgets to identify and assemble evidence against the kingpins and
soldiers of the operation would be the perfect way to prove the worth of
the investment.
The attack against the gang proceeds on several fronts. Telephone
poles at every intersection of Slumville are conspicuously outfitted with
bullet-resistant video cameras, equipped with wide-angle lenses and 24-
hour recording capacity. Miniature video cameras with pinhole apertures
are covertly installed in a number of Slumville buildings thought to
house gang members. At night, police periodically fly over the area in
helicopters, armed with nightscopes that have a magnification capability
of 500x and devices that detect heat waves emanating from buildings, a
telltale sign of a drug processing laboratory.
Any car that leaves or enters the area is tracked electronically,
following signals from transponders installed as part of Chicago's
Intelligent Transportation System or, if the transponder has been
removed, using signals from a beeper attached to the car by projectile
launcher. At various streets leading into Slumville, checkpoints are
established. At each one, the department installs devices that produce
detailed pictures of objects concealed by clothing or car exteriors.
Similar hand-held devices are used by foot and car patrols to scan
passersby. As a final measure, the city contracts with the federal
government to have photographs of Slumville taken whenever a satellite
is within range; these pictures can be enhanced to highlight suspicious
activity.
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All of this technology exists today, albeit in differing stages of
development. Some of it (e.g., beepers and video cameras) has been
available to the police in some form for decades.' Other technologies
(e.g., sensitive "see-through" technology and satellite photography) have
only recently begun to find their way into the law enforcement arsenal,2
partly as the result of the "peace dividend" associated with the end of the
Cold War? Although none of this technology is routinely used by the
average police department at present, it is likely to become more
prevalent as it becomes less expensive and better known.
Unfortunately, current law is ill-equipped to handle the issues raised
by this merger of space-age science and modem-day law enforcement.
Indeed, police use of this surveillance technology is virtually unregulated
by either legislation or administrative rules. While judicial decisions
have produced some useful criteria for deciding when and how to
regulate technological investigation, courts have failed to produce a
consistent or comprehensive approach to such regulation
In 1995, the American Bar Association began an effort to fill this
void. In May of that year, the ABA's Criminal Justice Section estab-
lished a Task Force on Technology and Law Enforcement. Composed
of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, privacy experts, national
security experts, law professors, and representatives of federal and state
law enforcement agencies,6 the Task Force was initially directed to
1. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 173 (1967) (noting that
according to a "thorough" 1957 study of local and state governmental surveillance,
"tracking devices ... and hidden cameras were widely used not only by urban police and
prosecutors' offices but also by suburban departments, sheriffs' offices, state troopers,
highway patrols, and state attorney-generals' [sic] offices, as well as some state regulatory
agencies and legislative committees.").
2. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, New Devices May Let Police Spot People on the Street
Hiding Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at Al, A10 (noting law enforcement plans to
install sensitive weapon-detection systems in prisons and courthouses, and describing
research into devices that could detect weapons under clothing from up to 60 feet away);
Krysten C. Kelly, Note, Warrantless Satellite Surveillance: Will Our Fourth Amendment
Privacy Rights Be Lost in Space?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 729, 761
(1995) ("[L]aw enforcement agencies will eventually use the satellite in surveillance....").
3. For instance, the fastest, longest-range detection device was developed by the U.S.
Army. See Butterfield, supra note 2, atA10. Satellite photography was also developed for
military purposes. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 730 r.10-12.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. Letter from William H. Jeffiess, Jr., Chairofthe ABA's Criminal Justice Standards
Committee, to Sheldon Krantz, Chair of the Task Force (May 3, 1995) (on file with the
Harvard Journal ofLaw and Technology) [hereinafter Jeffress Letter].
6. The Task Force originally consisted of nine members and eleven liaisons from
various interested organizations. Membership changed over the two-year period of the Task
Force.
Task Force Members: Sheldon Krantz, Chair, Piper & Marbury, Washington, DC;
Walter Bruce Brownridge, General Counsel to the Cleveland Police Department, Cleveland,
[Vol. 10
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review the ABA's Electronic Surveillance Standards.7 These standards,
which cover wiretapping and bugging, have not been substantially
revised since 1978.8 However, the ABA also recognized the need to
expand the scope of these standards to reflect the development of other
"advanced investigative tools" - tools that might require a rebalancing
of "the need for aggressive law enforcement with privacy and freedom
... considerations."9
To carry out this objective, the Task Force divided law enforcement
surveillance practices into three conceptual categories: communications
surveillance, physical surveillance, and transactional surveillance."0 The
OH; the Honorable James G. Carr, Judge, U.S. District Court, Toledo, OH; Scott Charney,
Chief, Computer Crime Unit, U.S. Department of Justice; Andrew Good, defense attorney,
Silverglate & Good, Boston, MA; the Honorable Richard Huffinan, Associate Justice,
Fourth District Court of Appeal, San Diego, CA; Professor Wayne R. LaFave, University
of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, IL; Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Washington, DC; Gail Thackeray, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix,
AZ.
Reporters: Professor Christopher Slobogin, University of Florida College of Law,
Gainesville, FL; the Honorable Martin Marcus, Judge, Bronx County Supreme Court,
Bronx, NY.
Liaisons: James M. Caterson, National District Attorneys Association; Ronald
Goldstock, ABA Criminal Justice Section Council; Samuel A. Guiberson, ABA Criminal
Justice Section Science and Technology Committee; Mary F. Harkerider, U.S. Department
of Justice; William J. Johnson, National Association of Police Organizations; Lionel
Kennedy, National Security Agency; Albert J. Krieger, National Association for Criminal
Defense Lawyers; Emil P. Mosehella, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Eric M. Noonan,
National Association of Attorneys General; Ronald L. Plesser, ABA Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Section; Terrence Sheridan, Major Cities Chiefs Association; Jo-Ann
Wallace, National Legal Aid and Defender Association; Daniel Weitzner, Center for
Democracy and Technology (ad hoe liaison); R. Hackney Wiegmann, U.S. Department of
Defense;BradWiegmann, U.S. DepartmentofDefense (replacingR. Hackney Wiegmann);
Stuart Wirtz, Federal Bureau of Investigation (replacing Emil P. Moschella).
7. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 2 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
Electronic Surveillance Standards]. These standards originated in the AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (Tentatie Draft 1968) [hereinafter PROJECT].
8. The Electronic Surveillance Standards were modified in 1978 (Kenneth J. Hodson,
Chair, Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice; Frank J.
Remington, Chair, Task Force on Electronic Surveillance; James G. Carr, Reporter) and in
1986 (William H. Erickson, Chair, Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice; Eugene Cerruti, Reporter). Both revisions consisted primarily ofupdating
commentary, although the 1978 revision did result in some changes to black-letter standards
as well.
9. Jeffress Letter, supra note 5, at 1.
10. The Task Force identified two other areas of concern: searches and seizures of
computers, and encryption. The former focuses primarily on searches and seizures of
technology, as opposed to searches and seizures usingtechnology. Encryption involves the
use of technology toprevent searches and seizures. Accordingly, these areas are not closely
related to the three categories identified in the text.
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term communications surveillance encompasses the real-time" intercep-
tion of oral, written, and electronic communications using electronic or
other means. 2 Physical surveillance involves the real-time observation
or detection of movements, activities, and conditions. Finally, transac-
tional surveillance refers to efforts to access pre-existing records such as
phone logs, electronic mail logs, credit card histories, other financial
transaction data, and air, train, and bus travel bookings. 3
This Article describes the ABA's current efforts to establish
guidelines for technologically-assisted physical surveillance (i.e.,
physical surveillance that uses the types of technology described earlier).
The Appendix sets out the Tentative Draft Standards Concerning
Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance that were approved by
the Task Force in February, 1997.'4 The body of the Article explains the
process by which these standards were created. Part II describes and
analyzes current law on the subject. Part III outlines the Task Force's
current approach to technologically-assisted physical surveillance. Part
IV identifies the issues that generated the most debate within the Task
Force and explains how they were resolved. 5 The primary purposes of
this Article are to alert interested parties (including law enforcement
officials, lawyers, and the public) to the ABA's efforts and to encourage
feedback.
11. The term "real-time" describes activities that occur in the present according to a
conventional human time frame. With regard to communication, "real-time" surveillance
occurs contemporaneously; it does not include searches of records of past transactions.
12. Standards on this topic are currently being revised by the Task Force, with the
Honorable Martin Marcus as Reporter.
13. See generally Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commer-
cial Dissemination of Personal information, 65 TEx. L. Rav. 1395, 1397-1402 (1987).
Although this information can be accessed through traditional means, computers greatly
facilitate "collecting, storing, processing and disseminating personal data." Id. at 1397.
Given resource and time constraints, the Task Force is not likely to develop standards in this
area.
14. As the title indicates, these standards are only preliminary. Although the Task
Force has approved them, to become official ABA policy they must be endorsed by a
majority of the ABA House of Delegates. Before that can occur, the standards and
accompanying commentarymustbe reviewed by the Criminal Justice Standards Committee
(a group ofjudges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors) and the standards (sans commen-
tary) must be reviewed and approved by the Criminal Justice Section Council (a similarly-
constituted group), with the latter subjecting the standard to two formal readings.
15. Although a commentary to the Tentative Draft Standards exists, it is not reproduced
here for several reasons. First, it is still in draft form, as it must be because significant
changes to the standards could occur. See supra note 14. Second, even the draft version
is extremely long. Third, the ABA retains copyright over the commentary. Nonetheless,
the overlap between the draft commentary and this Article is significant, if only because the
two documents have the same author.
[Vol. 10
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II. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
To the extent any regulation of law enforcement use of
technologically-assisted physical surveillance has occurred, it has come
primarily from courts. In contrast to electronic surveillance of communi-
cations 6 and some types of transactional surveillance, phy~lcal
surveillance has never been the subject of concerted legislative oversight.
Neither the ABA's Electronic Surveillance Standards 8 nor the analogous
federal provisions dealing with electronic surveillance (Title III) regulate
technological enhancement of physical surveillance. 9 State and local
lawmaking bodies have also largely avoided the issue.2"
Courts, on the other hand, have been increasingly active in setting
legal parameters for the use of these surveillance devices. Judicial
analysis has focused on whether, and to what extent, the Fourth
Amendment is implicated by physical surveillance. The initial question
under that Amendment has been whether the surveillance is a "search."
Since Katz v. United States,2' in which the Supreme Court held that
police use of a bugging device to eavesdrop on a phone booth
conversation is a Fourth Amendment search, this threshold has been
defined as police action that infringes on "expectation[s] of privacy...
16. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994) [hereinafter Title 1I]. Since the enactment of the 1968 Act,
there have been two significant amendments to Title III: the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.) (regulating, inter alia, the interception of cellular phone calls and electronic
mail) and the Digital Telephony Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414,108 Stat. 4279 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. 1997) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
(dealing primarily with the configuration of communications systems to facilitate access by
law enforcement).
17. For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act regulates access to stored
electronic communications and electronic bulletin board member lists. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(1)(A) (1994). The Right to Financial Privacy Act regulates access to financial
information. See 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1994). The Cable Television Privacy Act regulates
disclosure of identifying information about cable subscribers. See 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
18. As the commentary to the Project stated, "[1]t was felt that the standards should be
limited to aural surveillance, since it was in this field that we had the greatest experience
and that to attempt to go beyond that experience now would be premature." PROJECT, supra
note 7, at 104.
19. But see infra text accompanying note 94.
20. See, e.g., Richard Cole, Man with Hidden Camcorder May Be Guilty, But of
What?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 26, 1996, atA3 (reporting that surreptitious filming
of private club members is not a crime unless simultaneous audio recording occurs). But
cf. SEMINOLE COUNTY FLORIDA, SEMINOLE COUNTY FLORIDA TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM POLICY FOR USE OF TRAFFIC MONITORING DEVICEs (1996) (on file with the
HarvardJournal ofLaw and Technology) (detailing regulations that govem public use of
video cameras by law enforcement agencies).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'" Assuming
surveillance does implicate the Fourth Amendment, the second question
concerns the criteria necessary to authorize surveillance - a warrant
based on probable cause, something more, or something less. One of the
Task Force's first tasks was to analyze judicial treatment of these issues
with respect to physical surveillance.
A. Factors from the Case Law
In deciding whether a particular type of physical surveillance is a
search and, if so, how to regulate it, the courts have adopted a multi-
factor approach. The seven factors discussed below overlap to some
extent; further, in any given case only a few may be explicitly mentioned.
Considered together, however, they span the universe of considerations
that courts have applied to physical surveillance, whether or not it is
technologically-aided.
1. The Nature of the Place To Be Observed
The most important factor has been the nature of the place subjected
to physical surveillance. Not surprisingly, given Katz's emphasis on
expectations of privacy, enhanced surveillance is least likely to be left
unregulated when it focuses on the home, normally the site of one's most
intimate activities. Thus, courts often hold that observing the interior of
a home or similar area is a search, at least when conducted with
enhancement devices. 4 In such instances, courts usually require a
22. Id. at 361.
23. Katz's holding that bugging a phone booth is a search established that while homes
may be the paradigmatic protected area, certain other areas are entitled to substantial
protection. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding that desk drawers
in an office are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d
800 (Minn. 1970) (holding that restrooms in a store are protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment); Alward v. State, 912 P.2d 243 (Nev. 1996) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a tent, even though positioned on public land); Statev. Baker, 271 A.2d 435 (N.J.
1970) (finding that a private room in a store is protected by the Fourth Amendment).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (observation of
a residence using a telescope); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976)
(same); State v. Ward, 617 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1980) (same); State v. Blacker, 630 P.2d 413
(Or. Ct. App. 1981) (same); State v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1975) (shining a
flashlight into a basement); Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1981)
(observation of an apartment using binoculars and a Startron nightscope); see also WAYNE
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2 (3d ed.
1996). As Professor LaFave notes, when the surveillance is with the naked eye, a different
view prevails: "At least when the officer only employs his natural senses, the prevailing rule
is that such uses of the senses 'made from a place where a police officer has a right to be
do not amount to a search in the constitutional sense."' Id. at § 2.3(c) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 10
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warrant based on probable cause, although in some situations more might
be required and in others less might be sufficient. For example, many
lower courts have held that video surveillance of the interior of a home
must meet the more stringent federal statutory requirements applied in
the wiretapping context." Toward the other end of the spectrum, in
United States v. Karo,26 the Supreme Court held that the use of an
electronic beeper to detect movement within a house is a search that
requires some type ofjudicial authorization, but left open the question
of whether probable cause or merely reasonable suspicion is required. 7
As developed below,2" many lower courts have held that even
suspicionless surveillance of homes is permitted under certain circum-
stances. Nonetheless, as a general rule courts accord homes and like
areas the most significant protection.
In contrast, when the surveillance is of an area outside a residence
or similarly private area, courts have often found the Fourth Amendment
irrelevant. For instance, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Knotts29 that use of a beeper to detect movement on the public roads is
not a search. Also not a search, according to the Court, is the use of an
illumination device to inspect the interior of a car through a window,"
the interior of a barn located in an open field,3' or the exterior of a boat.32
Nor is aerial surveillance of industrial33 or residential34 curtilage normally
a search, even if it takes place only 400 yards above the ground. 5
Consonant with these Supreme Court opinions, lower courts have
typically held that the use of enhancement devices to view cars,
curtilage, open fields, or public areas is not a search.36
25. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a Title
III warrant describing with particularity the place to be viewed is necessary to authorize
video surveillance, and may be issued only if other means of investigation have failed and
steps are taken to minimize unnecessary privacy intrusions); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d
674 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
27. Seeid. at718.
28. See infra notes 39, 56-57 & 62 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
involve a failure to take precautions, the use of "common" technology, and confirmation of
naked-eye viewing).
29. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
30. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
31. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
32. See Lee v. United States, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
33. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (a telescopic map-
making camera in aerial surveillance).
34. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
35. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (low-altitude helicopter surveillance).
36. See LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 2.2(b)-(c).
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2. The Steps Taken to Enhance Privacy
Even an area normally associated with an expectation of privacy
may not be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection if no efforts are
made to keep it private. Thus, in holding a flashlight inspection of a barn
to be outside the Fourth Amendment's purview, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Dunn" noted that the upper portion of a
"wall" through which police observed the interior consisted only of
netting material. 8 Similarly, in California v. Ciraolo,39 the fact that the
defendant's fence was only ten feet high, and thus would not have kept
observers on a truck or a double-decker bus from seeing his backyard
helped justify aerial surveillance of residential curtilage. In a like vein,
lower courts have often considered the presence of fences and curtains,
the height of windows, and whether objects were out of the line of
normal sight." In short, a lack of effort to protect privacy may mean that
one does not have any for Fourth Amendment purposes.
3. The Degree to Which the Surveillance Requires a Physical Intrusion
onto Private Property (i.e., the Location of the Observer)
In finding that no search had occurred in Ciraolo and its companion
case, Dow Chemical Company v. United States,4 the Court emphasized
the fact that the govemment had flown over the land rather than
physically intruded upon it.42 Similarly, a dog sniff of luggage is not a
search in part because the dog itself does not intrude into the luggage.43
Lower courts have echoed the view, which harkens back to pre-Katz
37. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
38. See id. at 298.
39. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
40. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 365 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that the
use of binoculars to look through the windows of a second floor apartment from 60 feet
away is not a search); People v. Hicks, 364 N.E.2d 440 (IIl. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that
the use of night binoculars to look into a first-floor hotel room when curtains could have
been pulled is not a search); State v. Littleton, 407 So.2d 1208 (La. 1981) (holding that the
use of binoculars to look into a hangar with a thirty- to forty-foot-wide opening is not a
search); State v. Louis, 672 P.2d 708 (Or. 1983) (holding that the use of a telephoto lens to
observe a person repeatedly positioning himself at a window is not a search).
41. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
42. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207 ("The observations... took place within public
navigable airspace... in a physically nonintrusive manner .... "); Dow Chem., 476 U.S.
at 237 ("The narrow issue ... concerns aerial observation of a 2,000-acre outdoor
manufacturing facility without physical entry.").
43. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (1983) (holding that because a dog
sniff"does not require opening the luggage [and] does not expose noncontraband items that
otherwise would remain hidden from public view... this investigative technique is much
less intrusive than a typical search").
[Vol. 10
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trespass analysis," that the absence of an intrusion diminishes Fourth
Amendment concerns. For instance, courts have sanctioned the use of
thermal-imaging devices to detect heat waves emanating from houses in
part because the surveillance does not require an entry.45
A closely related issue is whether the observer's vantage point is
"lawful"; this question is usually simply another way of asking whether
the surveillance involves an intrusion into private space. Even private
property can be a lawful vantage point, as demonstrated by the holding
in Dunn that viewing the interior of a structure from a privately-owned
open field is not a search46 and by lower court rulings that viewing the
interior of a home from that part of the curtilage that invites the public
(e.g., a sidewalk) is not a search.47 On the other hand, sufficiently
unusual vantage points, including those located in public space, may not
be "lawful" for Fourth Amendment purposes.48 When a vantage point is
lawful, however, even surveillance using enhancement devices is often
found to be acceptable - several courts have held, for instance, that so
long as the vantage point is lawful, using binoculars to look into a private
residence is not a search.49
4. The Nature of the Object or Activity Observed
In Ciraolo, the Court stated that Katz's rule protecting the privacy
of conversations "does not translate readily into a rule of constitutional
44. Prior to Katz, Fourth Amendment protection depended upon whether police actions
constituted a trespass on the property of the suspect. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that tapping telephone wires outside suspects' premises is not a
search); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (holding that listening to a
conversation in an adjoining room by means of a "detectaphone" placed against the wall is
not a search).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The
detection of the heat waste was not an intrusion into the home; no intimate details of the
home were observed, and there was no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals
within."); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that thermal
imaging devices do not in "any way penetrate structures within [the] area").
46. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987).
47. See LAFAvE, supra note 24, § 2.3(c).
48. See State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447 (Haw. 1978) (holding that a search occurs where
an officer climbs three-quarters of the way up a fence and braces himself on a fellow
officer's shoulder to use a telescope to see into a backyard).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (holding that the
use of binoculars to observe abasement through a window from neighboring property is not
a search); People v. Ferguson, 365 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); People v. Hicks, 364
N.E.2d 440 (I11. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Littleton, 407 So.2d 1208 (La. 1981); State v.
Thompson, 241 NW.2d 511 (Neb. 1976) (holding that the use of binoculars to observe a
living room from an alley where "officers had a right to be" is not a search); State v. Louis,
672 P.2d 708 (Or. 1983).
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dimensions that one who grows illicit drugs in his backyard" is entitled
to an expectation of privacy." Along the same lines, the Court has held
that testing a substance strongly believed to be cocaine is not a search,5
nor is a dog sniff of luggage that which alerts the police only to the
presence of contraband. 2 Observation of impersonal objects other than
illicit substances may also be less subject to regulation. In Dow
Chemical, the Court noted that the aerial photographs in dispute revealed
physical details of Dow's plant, but not "identifiable human faces or
secret documents," or other "intimate details."53 Similarly, several cases
holding that the use of thermal imaging devices is not a search character-
ize heat waves as "waste.
5 4
5. The Availability of the Technology to the General Public
The camera used in Dow Chemical had a magnification capability
of 240x" and cost $22,000. These facts did not give the Court pause,
because the camera could be purchased on the commercial market." The
Court, however, added that the same observation "using highly sophisti-
cated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such
as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant."57 Further, the use of "an electronic device to penetrate walls
or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical
formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different and far more
50. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,214 (1986). Presumably for the same reason
a burglar has no expectation of privacy. Cf Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12
(1978) ("A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a
thoroughly justified expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as
'legitimate."').
51. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("Congress has decided
... to treat the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus, governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact,
compromises no legitimate privacy interest.").
52. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (1983) ("The sniffdiscloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff
tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained
is limited.").
53. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986).
54. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,225 (D. Haw. 1991).
55. See Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 242-43 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (finding that the
camera allowed "enlargement to a scale of I inch equals 20 feet or greater, without
significant loss of detail or resolution") (emphasis added).
56. See id at 238 (describing the camera as "a conventional, albeit precise, commercial
camera commonly used in map-making").
57. Id.
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serious questions" than the camera surveillance in Dow Chemical.5
Lower courts have echoed these sentiments, quite often finding the
commonness of the surveillance technique to be dispositive.59
The reasoning in these cases takes on the flavor of the Supreme
Court's undercover investigation jurisprudence,' in which the targets of
surveillance are said to assume the risk that the people with whom they
interact will be government agents. In this context, however, the risk
said to be assumed is actually twofold. First, these courts are saying that
we must assume the risk that any device which is readily available on the
market will be used to observe our movements and activities. Second,
they are saying that, just as we should know that an acquaintance may be
working for law enforcement, we assume the risk that those using such
enhancement devices are government agents.
6. The Extent to Which the Technology Enhances the Natural Senses
Some courts have distinguished between devices that "improve"
human senses and devices that "replace" them, with the latter being more
likely to implicate the Fourth Amendment.6' Using the examples given
58. Id. at 239.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373,1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that
the use of a special lens is not a search because "such equipment is widely available
commercially"); Statev. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272,275 (S.D. 1988) (findingno search where
a camera with a zoom lens is used to photograph the interior of a residence and there is "no
showing that the cameras and lenses used... [are] 'sophisticated visual aids' or 'special
equipment not generally in use'); State v. Rose, 909 P.2d 280, 286 (Wash. 1996) (holding
that the use of a flashlight to look into a house is not a search in part because a flashlight
is "an exceedingly common device"); State v. Lange, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
(findingno search when standard binoculars and cameras equipped with generally available
standard and zoom lenses are used to view homes).
60. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,211 (1966) (holding that entry into
a home by an undercover agent posing as a drug dealer is not a search when defendant
invites him); United States v. White, 401 U.S 745, 752 (1971) (holding that taping a
conversation using a body bug on a government informant is not a search because there is
no significant difference between recording and hearing statements); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a government subpoena of bank records is not a
search because a depositor "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the government"); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735,743-44 (1979) (holding that obtaining a defendant's phone numbers from the
phone company is not a search because a person has no expectation of privacy "in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties").
61. Compare People v. Amo, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding that
binoculars may be used "to permit clandestine police surveillance of that which could be
seen from a more obvious vantage point without the optical aid") with United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the use of a dog is "not a mere
improvement of sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant
enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument").
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in Dow Chemical, a satellite or gadget that sees through walls could be
said to replace one's senses rather than enhance them because it sees
things that the police might never be able to see with the eye. Con-
versely, when enhancement devices simply "confirm" something already
seen by the naked eye, or see something that could be viewed with the
naked eye but for fear of discovery, the use is less likely to be seen as a
search, even if the surveillance is of the home.62 This idea may help
explain the holding in Texas v. Brown, , where the Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless use of a flashlight to search the interior of a car,
stating that "the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amend-
ment protection."'6
7. The Extent to Which the Surveillance Is Unnecessarily Pervasive,
Invasive, or Disruptive (i.e., Steps Taken to Minimize the Intrusion)
Finally, several courts addressing the propriety of physical surveil-
lance have considered a complex of factors analogous to those associated
with minimization in the electronic surveillance context.65  Most
significantly, they have looked at the number of people or objects
observed (the pervasiveness issue). For instance, while lower courts
accept the idea that a dog sniff of luggage is generally not a search,
several have expressed concern over the routine use of dogs to sniff all
packages in a particular area.6 6 Similarly, while aerial surveillance is
generally not considered a search, courts have condemned random aerial
patrols over wide-ranging areas.67 Along the same lines, in his dissent
62. See United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812
F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the use of binoculars is not a search when they give
a "view of a readily visible marijuana plot previously observed with the naked eye"); State
v. Holbron, 648 P.2d 194, 197 (Haw. 1982) (finding no search where binoculars are used
only to confirm unaided observations); State v. Irwin, 718 P.2d 826, 829-30 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that the use of an enhancement device from nearby woods in order to
avoid detection is not a search).
63. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).,
64. Id. at 740.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994) (stating that electronic surveillance "shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter...").
66. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1336 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated,
463 U.S. 1202 (1983) ("Nothing would invoke the specter of a totalitarian police state as
much as the indiscriminate, blanket use of trained dogs at roadblocks, airports and train
stations."); United States v. Whit& ead, 849 F.2d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Place
obviously did not sanction the indiscriminate, blanket use oftrained dogs in all contexts.").
67. See State v. Riley, 511 So.2d 282, 287-89 (Fla. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
(finding that low-level, indiscriminate helicopter surveillance is a search); People v. Agee,
200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (criticizing wide-ranging aerial surveillance
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in Jacobsen, Justice Brennan cautioned against reading the Court's
contraband search cases to permit police dogs to "roam the streets at
random, alerting officers to people carrying cocaine," to allow drug
scanning devices to "scan... all passersby," or to authorize the use of
such devices "to identify all homes in which [contraband] is present."6
Conversely, "dragnet" use of such methods in a context of well-
recognized danger (e.g., magnetometers in an airport) might be enthusi-
astically welcomed. 9 In this type of situation, courts have recognized
that the pervasiveness of the search may make it less invasive; 7 in other
words, subjecting everyone to a search may create less of a sense of
oppression or intrusion than singling out particular individuals without
suspicion.
The duration of the surveillance and its intensity are also relevant to
the invasiveness issue. Courts have leveled criticism at prolonged
observation"' and at observation that is insufficiently limited in
objective.72 A few courts have also expressed concern about "blanket"
surveillance under which a target's every public movement is conspicu-
ously observed.73
Finally, the disruptiveness of the surveillance might be a factor. In
Florida v. Riley,74 the Supreme Court suggested that low-altitude, aerial
surveillance might become a search if conducted with "hazard to persons
or property on the surface" or in a way that interferes with "normal use
as a police-state tactic).
68. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But
see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969) (noting that dragnet seizures of
people to obtain fingerprints might be reasonable if done in a manner that is not overly
invasive).
69. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 62-63 (1991).
70. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,663 (1979) (finding thatwhile random
stops are impermissible, the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops
is one possible alternative"). At least one court has recognized that "[i]t is not necessary for
a check-point to stop every car in order to be systematic but only for officers to be following
some pattern that will minimize their discretion in choosing whether to stop a particular
auto." People v. Estrada, 386 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. 1981) (involving
officers who observed the interior of a home, including private sexual conduct, for nine days
using binoculars and a nightscope).
72. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251,257 (9th Cir. 1965) (requiring
that observations be limited "to the times when [restroom] crimes are most likely to occur").
73. See, e.g., McGee v. Hester, 724 F.2d 89,90-92 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that open
and excessive surveillance is grounds for a civil rights action when it diminishes store sales).
But cf United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (responding to the argument that
unlimited beeper surveillance is unconstitutional, the Court stated: "if such dragnet type law
enforcement practices ... should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.").
74. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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of the [home] ... or curtilage."75 Lower courts also have looked at the
altitude of the aircraft and resulting disruption.76 One could imagine
similar considerations affecting the propriety of the use of other types of
surveillance such as aggressive, overt use of video cameras to record a
political meeting.
B. Analysis of the Factors
The multiplicity of factors considered by courts in deciding the
scope of the Fourth Amendment's application to physical surveillance
makes any clear statement of the law in this area difficult. Nonetheless,
the Task Force eventually concluded that some sort of multi-factor
approach is both inevitable and proper given the elusive nature of the
privacy concept.77 Indeed, Standard 2-6.1 (c)(ii) essentially replicates the
seven factors described above and adds a few of its own.
At the same time, several of the factors identified by the courts are
probably entitled to very little weight as a matter of constitutional law or
policy. While factors (1) and (7), dealing with the place observed and
the minimization concept, respectively, seem central to any analysis of
physical surveillance technology, the other factors' relevance to this
endeavor are suspect to varying degrees. A brief survey of the ways in
which these remaining five factors are deficient aids the evaluation of the
case law and the standards.
Factor (2), which focuses on ease of observation, is suspect for two
reasons. First, it is troublesome to the extent it affords less protection to
those who, for economic or other uncontrollable reasons, cannot take
steps to protect their privacy. More importantly, as roany have pointed
out, basing the degree of protection from government surveillance on
75. Id. at 451-52.
76. See, e.g., Gianocola v. West Va. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th
Cir. 1987) (considering the effect of aerial surveillance on ground activity); People v.
Sneed, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1973) ("[The defendant had] a reasonable
expectation of privacy to be free from noisy police observation by helicopter from the air
at 20 to 25 feet and that such an invasion was an unreasonable governmental intrusion into
the serenity and privacy of his backyard."); State v. Rogers, 673 P.2d 142, 143 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) ("[C]ourts have considered... altitude of the aircraft, use of equipment to
enhance the observation, frequency of other flights and intensity of the surveillance.").
77. See infra Part IV.C.2.
78. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the
FourthAmendment, 46 GEO. WASH.L.REV. 529,541-42,542 nn.94-95 (1978) (noting that
privacy exists only for "those wealthy enough to live exclusively in private places");
Kenneth Troiano, Comment, LawEnforcement Use ofHigh Technology: Does Closingthe
Door MatterAnymore?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 83, 92 (1988) (noting that only professional
criminals and the wealthy can afford the technology to hide from high technology
surveillance).
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efforts to evade it runs the risk of fostering a closed society in which
people routinely curtail contact with the outside world.79 The advent of
highly intrusive technologies exacerbates this risk, since increasing levels
of precaution (e.g., thicker walls, heavily curtained windows, and
avoidance of public exposure) are necessary to render them ineffective.
Factor (3), the location of the observer, should also at most be a
secondary consideration in privacy analysis. As with factor (2), those
with less wherewithal may have reduced protection from surveillance
simply because they cannot distance themselves from lawful vantage
points. More importantly, the location of the observer may often have
little to do with the degree of privacy intrusion. Surveillance of one's
bedroom (or one's closed-in backyard) is equally intrusive whether
conducted via binoculars or by an officer who has trespassed and
remains hidden from view. Indeed, attributing significance to physical
intrusion may encourage the police to engage in "non-physical" searches
that are actually more intrusive.8"
Factor (4), the object(s) of the surveillance, is of questionable
relevance to the extent it forces distinctions between "intimate" and
"non-intimate" objects - into which category does one place clothing,
book covers, or unoccupied living rooms? Even if the factor is refocused
on whether the object is contraband, it remains suspect to the extent it
permits dragnet searches of the type described by Justice Brennan in his
Jacobsen dissent."' On the other hand, if limited by factor (7), the
minimization factor, whether surveillance reveals only illicit items may
be an important and useful variable in expectation of privacy analysis.8"
79. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 402 (1974).
[S]o far as I am presently advised of the state of the mechanical arts
- anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the
cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the
lights and remaining absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not
required in order to claim the benefit of the Amendment because, if
it were, the Amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the
kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the
Amendment is supposed to function.
Id. at 402; see also Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed
Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 38-39 (1989)
("Whatever the Supreme Court meant by the reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz, it
could not have anticipated that the term would be turned around and used to mandate nearly
absolute security before Fourth Amendment protection attaches.").
80. See David E. Steinberg, Making Sense ofSense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 563, 591 (1990).
81. See supra text accompanying note 68.
82. Cf Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MIck. L. REv. 1229, 1246-48 (1983); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"." An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L.
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Factor (5), the availability of the technology to the public, is flawed
because of its close association with the assumption of risk rationale,
which many commentators consider to be tautological: in a real sense,
we only assume those risks of unregulated government intrusion that the
courts tell us we have to assume. 3 Left on our own, our "assumptions"
about what types of enhancement devices we expect to be used, and by
whom, might be quite different from what the courts tell us they should
be.8" Furthermore, giving full weight to this factor would eliminate
privacy expectations even in much of the home because so many highly
intrusive devices (e.g., $22,000 map-making cameras) are readily
"available" to the public.
Factor (6), whether a device replaces, rather than enhances naked-
eye observation, may ultimately be premised on a false distinction.
Presumably, if the enhancement device does not in some way "replace"
police vision, it will not be used in the first place. If, for instance, the
police in Knotts8' could have tailed the suspect's car without using a
beeper, why didn't they?86 In the "confirmation" cases,87 if the police
could see into the premises with the naked eye, why were enhancement
devices used? In each case, the device was apparently viewed as a more
efficient, but not necessary, way of pursuing the police investigation.
REv. 1077, 1121-28 (1987); Steinberg, supra note 80, at 617.
83. As Professor Coombs states: "Once we decide the parameters ofthe government's
power, the claimant 'assumes' whatever risk inheres in that legal rule." Mary I. Coombs,
Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1593, 1643 (1987); see also Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and
Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced
Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSEL.REv. 647,670 (1988) ("[The] 'assumption ofrisks'[analysis]
... miss[es] the mark.... It overlook[s] the central issue, the significance of...
surveillance as a threat to our sense of security.").
84. In a study I conducted with Joseph Schumacher, subjects asked to rate the
"intrusiveness" of fifty different search scenarios frequently disagreed with the Supreme
Court's conclusions about expectations of privacy. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy andAutonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized andPermitted by Society", 42
DuKE L.J. 727, 740-42 (1993). For instance, while the Court has held that a dog sniff, see
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and a trespass on open fields, see Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), are not searches, the subjects in the study saw these
actions to be as intrusive as a frisk, which the Court held is a search in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra, at 737-41.
85. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
86. As one court has stated, if a beeper simply permits the police to do more easily
what they could accomplish with the naked eye, "then there is no need for the device in the
first place. Its value lies in its ability to convey information not otherwise available to the
government." United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 n.13 (5th Cir. 1975), affid en
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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A hypothetical, but not unrealistic,"8 example illustrates the insidious
effect of incautiously applying these five factors. Suppose the police,
while hiding in bushes at the edge of a farm, use a nightscope with
magnification capability to look in a darkened bedroom window located
on the second story of a house 500 yards away. Given its location
(factor (1)), the bedroom is presumptively entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection, especially if the surveillance is prolonged (factor (7)). But
suppose the window curtains are not drawn (factor (2)); the police do not
move beyond the edge of the property (factor (3)); the only items
actually spied are contraband and furniture (factor (4)); the nightscope
is commercially available, albeit costly 9 (factor (5)); and the police are
worried that closer, unaided viewing would give away their presence
(factor (6)). A strong case can then be made that the action is not a
search. That result should not be countenanced, as it would allow police
to engage in such conduct at random, without developing any degree of
suspicion or seeking authorization from a magistrate.9"
C. The Narrowness of the Case Law
In short, many of the factors that courts consider in the regulation of
physical surveillance are of dubious value.9 Insufficient sensitivity to
this fact is not the only failing of the case law, however. As might be
expected from a decisionmaking process that requires a case and
controversy and is focused on constitutional doctrine, the case law leaves
88. See United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (involving continuous covert surveillance ofthe curtilage from private property
using a Bushnell spotting scope with 45x magnification, a Questar lens with 130x
magnification, infrared goggles, and a Javelin nightscope capable of magnifying existing
light 50,000 times; in dicta the majority stated that this was not an invasion of a reasonable
expectation of privacy protected under the Fourth Amendment).
89. A hand-held Vacro Noctron V scope costs about $3,300. A Startron Headstone
(a nightscope mounted on a headset) costs about $4,200. See Mike Cook, Scopes for
Nighttime Use a Valuable Toolfor Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, BATON
ROUGE ST. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1991, at 2C.
90. For an incisive and comprehensive analysis of a similar hypothetical, see Harvey
Wingo, A 2020 Vision of Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 71 Op. L. REV.
1(1992).
91. In developing their own analyses, for example, Professor Power and Professor
Steinberg make no mention of many of these factors. Professor Power appears to focus
primarily on factors (I) (location), (5) (availability) and (7) (minimization). See Power,
supra note 79, at 87-111. Professor Steinberg's analysis consists of three components: one
analogous to factor (3) (nature of target) and two related to factor (7), which are balanced
to determine whether a wan-ant is required. See Steinberg, supra note 80, at 613 (arguing
that the specificity of the information revealed, the duration of the search, and the extent to
which the enhanced search requires officers to focus on a particular individual are the key
variables).
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many important issues unresolved. These unresolved issues can be
divided into four categories: implementation of authorized surveillance,
selection of rulemakers, selection of decisionmakers, and accountability.
The two most important implementation issues that have yet to be
comprehensi~'ely addressed concern the results of physical surveillance.
Consider, for instance, the fact that video surveillance of public areas can
produce hours of tape that might be useful for any number of purposes:
from identifying perpetrators of violent crime to identifying jaywalkers;
from recording speeders to recording traffic accidents; from discovering
which people visit a certain area to discovering whether an alleged
adulterer visits his alleged paramour. The first issue raised by this reality
concerns disclosure. To whom and for what purposes may such tapes be
disclosed? The second issue pertains to retention. For how long and for
what purposes may such recordings be maintained? Current law is
almost silent as to whether information obtained for one purpose may be
used for another, or when recordings of an investigation should be
destroyed.92
Several other implementation issues are also left unaddressed by
case law and legislation. One interesting question is whether the subjects
of completed covert physical surveillance are entitled to notice of the
surveillance. Another is whether police should have to validate the
reliability of the technology they use.
The second set of unresolved issues concerns the entities that
construct the rules regulating physical surveillance. Courts will probably
be the primary players when the Constitution is implicated.93 But
implementation of broad constitutional mandates often requires fine
tuning.94 Furthermore, physical surveillance that is not restricted by
constitutional precepts might nonetheless justifiably be subject to some
limitation.95 By imposing rules when constitutional interpretation is not
involved, courts might be usurping others' authority - legislatures,
92. Cf Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 550 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1996), may bar disclosure of information obtained
by the Naval Investigative Service to the subject's employer, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, at least when no charges are filed); Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d
751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that collecting information for security-clearance
purposes might be incompatible with disclosing it for criminal investigation purposes).
93. But see Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz": Lessons for
America, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99,131-32 (1990) (arguing that Congress has the
authority, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to pass a code of criminal
procedure based on constitutional precepts).
94. For instance, the FBI has developed informal guidelines on the use of beepers.
Personal Communication with Scott Chamey, Chief, Computer Crime Unit, U.S.
Department of Justice (Feb. 10, 1997).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 123-27, 187-88.
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municipal bodies, and the police themselves could serve as rulemakers
in both situations.96
Regarding who should decide whether an established rule authorizes
a particular surveillance action, Fourth Amendment case law recognizes
numerous situations where a police officer, rather than a judge, is the
appropriate arbiter.97 It fails to recognize, however, that other entities
could be consulted as well. Especially in non-exigent circumstances that
do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, legislative bodies, prosecutors,
and the public affected by the surveillance might all be involved in the
decisionmaking process. Further, when the police are delegated
decisionmaking responsibility, distinctions might be made between
different levels of decisionmakers (e.g., field officers versus supervisors).
Accountability is the final important physical surveillance issue only
partially addressed by the case law. Courts, lacking any direct control
over law enforcement agencies and other government officials, have
relied primarily on exclusionary rules as an enforcement mechanism.98
But this sanction has been controversial, to put it mildly.99 Accordingly,
the rule is often not invoked even when a constitutional violation has
occurred,"° much less when a subconstitutional rule is involved. In the
latter situations, other types of sanctions might be advisable; indeed,
even when exclusion is appropriate additional sanctions might be
96. A significant body ofliterature recognizes the possibility that these entities can and
even should play a role in rulemaking. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 423-29
(enumerating the reasons police should be involved in rulemaking); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-4.3 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) ("Police discretion can best be
structured and controlled through the process of administrative rule making by police
agencies. Police administrators should, therefore, give the highest priority to the
formulation of administrative rules governing the exercise of discretion, particularly in the
areas of selective enforcement, investigative techniques, and enforcement methods.");
Samuel Walker, Controlling the Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63
U. DET. L. REV. 361,363-64,382-84 (1986) (arguing that legislation is necessary to guide
police rulemaking); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 284-90 (1968)
(discussing ways in which the community could be involved in rulemaking).
97. For a list of "exigent circumstances" in which field officers may make warrantless
searches, see CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
132-33 (3d ed. 1993).
98. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (holding that evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded, in part because other remedies are
"futile").
99. See generally Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the
Attorney General on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
573,608-617 (1989) (detailing the costs ofthe exclusionary rule, including a failure to deter
police, lost convictions, disrespect for the judicial system, failure to provide a remedy for
the innocent, and the insidious effect on probable cause determinations by judges).
100. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,923-24 (1984) (holding that exclusion is
not required even when the Fourth Amendment is violated if evidence is seized in good faith
reliance on a warrant).
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imposed. If so, as with rulemaking and decisionmaking, legislative and
administrative entities might be involved in ensuring accountability for
violations of the rules. Moreover, accountability need not be solely a
matter of sanctions. Documentation of surveillance decisions, periodic
review of those decisions, and public dissemination of information about
physical surveillance might also make the police feel accountable for the
surveillance they conduct.''
It is quite understandable why, given their limited role, courts have
not dealt with these types of implementation, rulemaking and
decisionmaking, and accountability issues. Many of these issues are not,
and probably should not be, accorded constitutional status; that does not
make them unworthy of consideration, however. Any attempt to regulate
law enforcement use of physical surveillance comprehensively must at
least consider the various options that are available.
III. THE ABA's APPROACH: AN OVERVIEW
The regulatory principles that can be derived from the case law
governing physical surveillance are inadequate in a number of ways.
Legislation has yet to fill the legal void. The Task Force's Draft
Standards attempt to rectify this situation by providing guidelines for
policymakers, judges, and police departments.
The Task Force's efforts proceeded through three conceptual stages.
The first stage consisted of identifying the scope of the problem. The
second stage involved the development of general principles that should
govern the use of physical surveillance technology. The final stage
involved elaboration of these general principles in specific contexts.
A. The Categories of Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance
In addition to learning the relevant law, an initial goal of the Task
Force was to determine the types of physical surveillance devices that are
or may become available to the police. The Task Force heard expert
briefings on this topic from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Science and Technology division of the National Institute of Justice, the
Director of Community-Oriented Policing Services at the Department of
101. The Electronic Surveillance Standards require annual reports from bothjudges and
prosecutors concerning the number of surveillance orders applied for, denied and granted,
the duration of the surveillance, the identity of those authorizing and executing the
surveillance, and a number of other facts relating to surveillance orders. See Electronic
Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, Standard 5.16. They also require that information
from the reports be disseminated to the public. See id. Title III requires public dissemina-
tion of similar information. See 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1994).
[Vol. 10
HeinOnline  -- 10 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 404 1996-1997
No. 3] Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance 405
Justice, and two state police representatives. In addition, the Task Force
sought comments on an earlier version of the Draft Standards from eight
police organizations, ranging from the International Association of
Chiefs of Police to the National Sheriffs Association. 2
As a result of this input and its own investigations, the Task Force
divided physical surveillance devices into five separate categories:" 3
video cameras, tracking devices, telescopic devices, illumination devices,
and detection devices (i.e., devices capable of detecting concealed
items). 4 These functional groupings are meant to describe the spectrum
of physical surveillance technologies that exist at present and that might
be developed in the foreseeable future. Only time will tell whether they
are adequate in the latter regard.
Video technology has been available for some time, but the past
three decades have seen dramatic advances in the field. With the advent
of wide-angle and pinhole lenses, night vision equipment, and super-
magnification capability, video surveillance allows viewing of home
interiors, workplaces, and public thoroughfares at all times. Cameras can
be placed in picture frames, briefcases, pens, suit lapels, and teddy bears,
permitting covert observation in virtually any circumstance. 5 They also
can be used overtly and conspicuously to observe private establishments
102. The Task Force sought comments from the Fraternal Order of Police, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Union of Police Organiza-
tions, the Major Cities Chiefs, the National Association of Police Organizations, the
National Sheriffs Association, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the U.S.
Department of Justice (Community Oriented Police Services).
103. This division was based largely on a memorandum from Wayne LaFave to the Task
Force (July 27, 1995) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology).
104. Originally, and for almost the full two years of the Task Force's work on the
physical surveillance standards, a sixth category also existed - aerial surveillance. This
category was ultimately dropped for two reasons. First, to the extent aerial surveillance
makes use of enhancement devices (e.g., map-making cameras), the other specific rules
already govern. Second, aircraft are functionally no different from cars, boats and other
vehicles; they assist the use of investigative technology but are not themselves devised for
the purpose of surveillance. Despite the deletion of this category, however, case law
governing aerial surveillance played a significant role in shaping the Task Force's thinking.
See supra Part II.A.
105. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson County Community College, 930 F. Supp. 501,
506 (D. Kan. 1996) (upholding video monitoring ofsecurity personnel locker area); James
Barron, Designer/Surveillance Consultant Sells Pricey Spy Ties, SAN ANTONIO ExPRsss-
NEws, Sept.22,1996, available in 1996 WL 11498094 (describing various items, including
ties and teddy bears, into which video cameras can be installed); Kim Christensen, Snoopy
Sales//Spies: Don 'tLookNow, But Big Brother Might Just Be Your Big Brother, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Aug. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7041469 (explaining the use of
pinhole-lens video cameras in briefcases and wall clocks).
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and public places.0 6 Furthermore, any surveillance by camera can be
recorded, creating a permanent record of activities within the camera's
range. 0
7
Tracking devices also come in many forms. The simplest is the
beeper, which emits a signal that can be traced.' Other tracking devices
under development or already in use include "over-the-horizon" radar;'19
bistatic sensor devices, which passively pick up various types of
emissions (e.g., from a cellular phone or a light source) or utilize an
active sonar-like capability;"' and tagging systems, which use a
projectile launcher to attach a beeper to a fleeing vehicle."' Intelligent
Transportation Systems (sometimes called Intelligent Vehicle Highway
Systems) involve fitting every vehicle in a given transportation network
with a radio unit that transmits to a base station." 2 While being studied
principally as a means of controlling traffic patterns, these systems
would also provide a way of tracking vehicles, or of discovering their
location at a previous point in time."3
Unlike modem video surveillance and tracking systems, some types
of telescopic and illumination devices - binoculars and telescopes,
flashlights and spotlights - have been available for more than a century.
106. David Kocieniewski, Police to Press Property-Crime Fight andinstall Cameras,
N.Y. TMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B4 (reporting that the New York City Police Department will
install new video surveillance cameras in some housing projects and subway stations).
107. Of course, video surveillance can be accompanied by audio capabilities as well, a
practice governed by the Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7.
108. See Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461, 1463-64 (1977) (explaining that beepers emit "periodic signals which can be
picked up on radio frequency [to] establish the approximate location of the object ....
Beepers have been used... to trace the movement of subjects on private property, along
public thoroughfares, or in public airways... [and] have [been] attached... to contraband
drugs discovered during border searches, to motor vehicles used by suspects, to packages
or drums of chemicals, to airplanes, and to an item of personal property").
109. See Department of the Air Force, Rome Laboratory, Over-the-Horizon Radar,
Advanced Technology Data Sheet (abstract presented at National Institute of Justice Law
Enforcement Technology Program, May 15, 1995) (on file with the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology).
110. See Department of the Air Force, Rome Laboratory, Electronic Support
Measurement, Bistatic Sensor Technology, Advanced Technology Data Sheet (abstract
presented at National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Technology Program, May 15,
1995) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology).
111. See Idaho Nat'l Engineering Laboratory, Fleeing Vehicle Tagging System (abstract
presented at National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Technology Program, May 15,
1995) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology).
112. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., NATIONAL PROGRAM PLAN FOR INTELLIGENT
TRANsPORTATION SYSTEMS (Final Draft 1994) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law
and Technology).
113. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration
of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, I I SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995).
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Today, however, new technology provides would-be viewers with
significantly greater ability to overcome obstacles created by distance
and darkness. Compact night-vision equipment using infrared technol-
ogy enables covert observation of virtually any nighttime activity,"'
while map-making and satellite cameras are able to focus on objects a
few feet across from thousands of feet above."5 Moreover, illumination
and telescopic capabilities can be combined in one instrument, as with
the well-known Startron binoculars." 6
Detection systems include a wide range of devices using x-ray, heat
sensing, holographic radar, and other technologies. Simple metal
detectors will soon be augmented with hand-held devices that can
discern the shape and size of items underneath a person's clothing, or
even behind walls; some of these devices may also reveal anatomical
details." 7 One such tool, developed by Millitech Corporation, registers
radiation emitted from the body and objects concealed on it."8 Because
these waves readily pass through clothing, and because the body is a
good emitter while dense, inanimate objects tend to be bad emitters,
inanimate objects show up as outlines against the body. A device
developed by Raytheon aims a low-intensity electromagnetic pulse at the
subject and measures the time-decay of each object radiated, which
differs depending upon the object. The device then compares the time-
decay of each object with known "signatures" of items like guns; no
image is produced." 9 A third example, from INEL, measures the
fluctuations in the earth's magnetic field caused by ferromagnetic
material, like the metal in a gun. 20 Other mechanisms have been
114. For instance, infi-ared technology used in IlT's Night Enforcer allows nightvision
in low-light conditions without any illumination that would give the observer away. These
devices are held in one hand, obtain high resolution, offer photo and telescopic capability,
and prevent "blooming" when bright light sources are encountered. See ITT Electro Optics
Product Division, Night Enforcer 250, 1IT Night Vision Equipment (abstract presented at
National Institute ofJustice LawEnforcement Technology Program, May 15,1995) (on file
with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology). For a general description of many of
these devices, see Gutterman, supra note 83, at 678.
115. For a description of some of the telescopic equipment in use today, see supra note
89. With respect to satellite surveillance, see Kelly, supra note 2, at 737 (describing current
ability "to generate and sell images derived from satellites capable of detecting objects as
small as one square yard").
116. See Cook, supra note 89.
117. See Millitech Corp., Millimeter Wave Concealed Weapon Detection and Through-
the-Wall Imaging Systems (abstract presented at National Institute of Justice Law
Enforcement Technology Program, May 15, 1995) (on file with the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology).
118. See id.
119. See David A. Harris, Superman 's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 1, 7-8 n.38 (1996).
120. See id.
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developed for detecting hidden explosives. and heat differentials from
a building (which might signal the use of kleig lights or furnaces
connected with the growth or manufacture of contraband).' 22
B. The General Principles
Having provisionally defined the types of physical surveillance
subject to regulation, the Task Force set out to develop overarching
principles to guide that regulation. The result is Standard 2-6.1, the
"general principles" standard. This Standard consists of seven sections,
which are only briefly outlined here. Detailed discussion of some of the
more controversial provisions is found in Part IV.
The first two sections of Standard 2-6.1 set the conceptual stage for
the rest of the Standards by specifying the various interests that are
implicated by law enforcement use of technologically-assisted physical
surveillance. Section (a) identifies the ways in which such surveillance
might be useful to law enforcement, while section (b) identifies the
societal harms it might cause.
More specifically, section (a) recognizes that technologically-
assisted physical surveillance might further many legitimate law
enforcement ends, from the detection, investigation, and deterrence of
crime to the protection of the innocent. Moreover, technology might
prove more reliable, less expensive, safer, and less intrusive than
traditional means of conducting surveillance. For instance, a permanent
video camera might be able to identify perpetrators more accurately and
at less expense than police patrols. Beepers can track a target for
prolonged periods, saving human capital and decreasing physical danger.
Weapon-detection devices might permit discovery of concealed weapons
from a distance with greater accuracy and less danger to the police than
a frisk, and with less inconvenience and embarrassment to the target.
At the same time, as section (b) recognizes, the use of these devices
"can diminish privacy, freedom of speech, association and travel, and the
openness of society." Physical surveillance of the home and similar
locations obviously poses significant risks of privacy invasion. But even
physical surveillance of more open areas can threaten values considered
important in a democratic society. Alan Westin, for example, has
theorized that the privacy concept encompasses four "states": solitude,
121. See Golden Engineering, XR150 (information presented at National Institute of
Justice Law Enforcement Technology Program, May 15, 1995) (on file with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology).
122. Such devices are sometimes called FLIRs (Forward Looking Infrared). See
generally Scott J. Smith, Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordinary Device Exception:
Redefining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 1071 (1996).
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intimacy, anonymity, and repose." Because people occasionally seek
these four states even in public spaces, privacy might be diminished by
virtually any type of public surveillance - including observation by
simple binoculars. Technologically-assisted physical surveillance can
diminish other values as well. For instance, freedom of speech and
association can be chilled through conspicuous video or telescopic
surveillance, as Orwell's 1984124 vividly demonstrates. The right to
travel might be infringed by the constant monitoring allowed by
Intelligent Transportation Systems. Most generally, the openness of
society, a quality arguably essential to a well-functioning democracy,"
might be threatened by pervasive monitoring.
To aid in deciding when, and to what extent, particular surveillance
should be regulated, section (c) of the general principles elaborates on
the competing factors outlined in sections (a) and (b). On the law
enforcement side, the nature of the law enforcement objective, the extent
to which it can be achieved through surveillance, and the seriousness of
the crime problem being investigated, deterred, or protected against are
all relevant in determining whether surveillance is justified. With respect
to privacy and related interests, section (c) lists the seven factors drawn
from the case law identified earlier 26 and adds three more: whether the
surveillance is covert or overt; the extent to which the surveillance
diminishes or enhances First Amendment freedoms; and the extent to
which "the surveillance technique is less intrusive than other available
effective and efficient alternatives." Thus, for instance, airport surveil-
lance using video cameras and detection devices might be more easily
justified than ordinary investigative surveillance using this technology
because of the significant interest in deterring terrorism, the overt nature
of such surveillance, and the fact that other methods are more intrusive
123. WEsTIN, supra note I, at 31-32.
124. GEORGEORWELL, 1984 (Bernard Crick ed., Oxford University Press 1984) (1949).
125. Totalitarian regimes maintain power not through the consent of
the governed but by physical, economic, and psychological
control over the populace. Such governments exercise control
through a variety of means, but among the most essential is the
use of the police power to reinforce the message that the
government is superior and in control of the individual. Mea-
sures such as identification checkpoints, random searches, the
monitoring of communications, and the widespread use of
informants not only are means of keeping track of the citizenry,
but also act as continuous symbolic reminders that the citizenry
is dominated by the government.
Scott Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM. L. Rv. 1751, 1778-79 (1994).
126. See supra Part II.A.
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or less efficient. Other examples of this balancing analysis are discussed
below."7
Surveillance that is duly authorized is still illegitimate if it is not
carried out properly. Section (d) of the general principles lists restric-
tions on the manner in which surveillance should be conducted. These
include rules dealing with the scope of the surveillance, the types of
devices used, notice to those observed, and disclosure and maintenance
of surveillance records.
First, to avoid discrimination, section (d) provides that subjects of
surveillance should not be selected in an arbitrary manner; this admoni-
tion is especially important where individualized suspicion might not be
required, as with checkpoints.' Second, for obvious reasons, "[tihe
scope of the surveillance should be limited to its authorized objectives
and be terminated when those objectives are achieved.' 29 Because new
surveillance techniques, some of doubtful efficacy, 3 ' are continuously
entering the market, the third subsection of this provision cautions that
the physical surveillance technology used "should be capable of doing
what it purports to do and be used solely by officers trained in its use."
Fourth, to address situations in which a device might simultaneously
make use of more than one technology covered by the specific standards
(e.g., a video camera with telescopic and illumination capabilities),
section (d) also states that, where there is a conflict between rules, the
more restrictive one applies.'
The fifth provision in section (d) states that "[r]easonable notice of
the surveillance should be given at an appropriate time and in an
127. See infra Part III.C.
128. Cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that suspicionless, random
stops of cars to check licenses violate the Fourth Amendment).
129. The appropriate conduct when the surveillance does not achieve its objective within
a certain period of time is unclear under the standard. On this issue, the preliminary
commentary states' "Certainly some [types of procedures] should have fixed time limits,
at least absent an extension granted by the authorizing person or agency. In some instances,
it may suffice that the surveilling officers are required to determine for the record why they
find the surveillance sufficiently promising to continue it." TENTATIVEDRAFr STANDARDS
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE § 2-6.1(d)(ii)
commentary (Draft, Feb. 20, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and
Technology).
130. See, e.g., Erik Milstone, Improbable Cause: Prosecutors Say Police May Have
Made Arrests Based on Questionable "Narcotics Divining Rod", 82-JUN A.B.A. J. 32
(1996) (reporting that the Quadro Tracker, a$3,000 drug detection device with sales ofover
1,000, "is little more than a black plastic box with a radio antenna attached to one end that
swirls when the box is moved," according to the Sandia National Laboratories).
131. For example, although cursory, overt use of an illumination device might not
require any justification, see Standard 2-6.5(b)(i), infra Appendix, if the device had a video
capability it would require a supervisor's finding that the legitimate law enforcement test
had been met, see Standard 2-6.3(c), infra Appendix.
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effective manner." In some situations (e.g., checkpoints), pre-surveil-
lance notice may be necessary to maximize deterrence and prevent public
alarm. 32 In others, post-surveillance notice to those subjected to the
surveillance may be advisable or even constitutionally required.'33
The final provisions of section (d) also involve post-surveillance
issues. By permitting disclosure of surveillance results only for
"designated" lawful purposes, provision (d)(vi) attempts to encourage
law enforcement officials, legislatures, and courts to adopt a regime that
relies on rules specifying when and to whom surveillance results may be
disclosed. The same design lies behind provision (d)(vii) requiring
"protocols" for the maintenance and disposition of surveillance records.
The primary objective of section (e) of the general principles is to
emphasize that courts are not the sole source of law, nor are magistrates
and police officers the sole implementers of that law. To that end, the
section lists various entities that might be involved in formulating,
monitoring, and enforcing the regulation of technologically-assisted
physical surveillance, and identifies factors that can help determine when
each entity might best be involved.
The first such factor is the "legal basis" of the proposed rule. If
surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment, courts are likely to be the
source of rules and sanctions, although legislatures and administrative
agencies might attempt to codify the rules developed.' In other
situations, whether the legislature, law enforcement officials, or the
public should be involved depends upon the "invasiveness and urgency
of the surveillance," the "need for deference to expertise in law enforce-
ment," the "extent to which local conditions may vary," the "value of
sharing decisionmaking," and the "number of people and size of the
geographic area affected by the surveillance."
This general principle departs somewhat from the standard Fourth
Amendment model in which courts make the law and either magistrates
(in non-exigent situations) or field officers (in exigent circumstances)
apply it. For example, given the number of people affected, the primary
rules governing placement of public video cameras or detection-device
checkpoints might come from municipal or state legislatures as well as
courts. Because local crime conditions vary and police have knowledge
132. Cf United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (upholding
checkpoint preceded by signs announcing its presence, in part because "[m]otorists using
these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere.").
133. See Bergerv.NewYork, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (holding aNewYorkwiretapping
statute unconstitutional because, inter alia, it "has no requirement for notice as do
conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing of
special facts").
134. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
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of those conditions, more specific rules concerning such surveillance
might be developed by individual police departments (a position
emphasized in section (g), discussed below). Further, section (e)
suggests that in determining where any particular camera or checkpoint
should be situated, neither a judge nor a field officer should be involved.
Rather, to ensure that decisions are based on all relevant information and
will be accepted by those affected, those decisions might involve
politically accountable police or local governmental officials, as well as
the public to be targeted by the surveillance.'35 Similarly, the emphasis
on the value of shared decisionmaking suggests that, in non-exigent
circumstances not governed by the Fourth Amendment, a police
supervisor should be involved in the surveillance decision. 6
Section (f) of the general principles focuses on the accountability of
those conducting surveillance. Ensuring accountability is especially
important in this context because so much technologically-assisted
physical surveillance is covert and thus does not alert its targets the way
a typical search and seizure does. The standard recognizes that the
exclusionary rule is required in some situations, but adds a number of
other accountability mechanisms. First, it provides that government
officials should develop "administrative rules which ensure that the
information necessary for... accountability is maintained." Second, it
calls for administrative sanctions for violation of surveillance rules, in
addition to any constitutionally required exclusionary sanctions.
Periodic review of the scope and effectiveness of surveillance is also
mandated. Finally, similar to the reporting requirements under the
federal wiretapping statute,'37 the standard provides that "information
about the general type or types of surveillance being used and the
frequency of their use" should be disseminated to the public in an effort
to keep the polity apprised of the extent of surveillance being conducted.
Section (g), the final provision in the general principles standard,
calls for administrative rulemaking by law enforcement officials.
Especially as to limitations that are not constitutionally required and that
consequently never receive attention from courts or magistrates, a
135. This position is taken in the standards governing long-term public video
surveillance and checkpoints using detection devices. See Standards 2-6.3(b)(ii) & 2-
6.6(a)(iv)(D), infra Appendix.
136. See Standard 2-6.3(b) & (c), infra Appendix (requiring approval from a politically
accountable official for long-term video surveillance ofnonprivate activities, locations, and
conditions and approval from a supervisor for other video surveillance of nonprivate
activities, locations and conditions); Standard 2-6.6(a)(iv), infra Appendix (requiring
approval from a politically accountable official for fixed checkpoints and from a supervisor
for temporary checkpoints).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1994) (requiring annual reports concerning frequency of
intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications).
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particular need for elaboration within the administrative process exists;
individual officers cannot be expected to work everything out for
themselves in these situations. Thus section (g) proposes that depart-
ments should develop policies that translate the general principles and
the specific rules of the standards into detailed guidelines for various
forms of physical surveillance.
Again, the purpose of the general principles is to provide a frame-
work for analyzing regulatory issues raised by physical surveillance.
Some of the principles were used in developing more specific rules. For
instance, section (c), concerning when surveillance is justified, dictates
whether probable cause or some lower level of certainty is required
before surveillance can take place. Similarly, section (e), dealing with
the decisionmaker, controls when field officers, higher level officials,
and the public are involved in decisionmaking. In contrast, the principles
described in section (d), concerning implementation of the surveillance,
and section (f), concerning accountability, were meant to stand on their
own without further elaboration in the specific standards. They were not
repeated in each of the specific standards because they usually apply in
the same fashion to any surveillance.
C. Definitions
Standard 2-6.2 contains ten definitions. Half of these definitions
explain the types of enhancement devices governed by the standards -
detection devices, illumination devices, telescopic devices, tracking
devices, and video surveillance. Other terms defined are "covert" and
"overt" surveillance, "reviewing law enforcement official," "private,"
and "legitimate law enforcement objective."
Although the various devices have already been described, the
definition of detection devices in section (b) requires some elaboration.
This term is defined to include any device that detects "the presence of
a particular object ... or characteristic ... that is concealed behind
opaque inanimate barriers." Devices that detect microscopic substances
or that "see" through human bodies are not covered by this definition.
On the other hand, devices that can "see" through clothing, wood, metal,
or other substances are included.138
A further distinction is made between general detection devices and
those that are "contraband-specific" and "weapon-specific." Although
most detection devices (e.g., x-ray machines and magnetometers
currently used at airports) are of the former variety, some devices purport
to detect only guns or explosives,139 and someday devices may simulate
138. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
139. See supra notes 119 & 121.
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the capability of "drug dogs" by signaling only the presence of contra-
band.
The general-specific distinction is important in light of case law
indicating that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by a police
action that detects only contraband. 4' As this section recognizes,
whether an object is "contraband" will depend upon whether the item is
"virtually always criminal to possess or use in the existing circum-
stances." Carrying drugs like marijuana or cocaine is virtually always
criminal. Carrying a concealed weapon, on the other hand, is not.
Possessing a weapon is virtually always criminal at an airport, but in the
majority of states today, carrying a concealed weapon is legally
permissible.' 4' In such states, a device that detected only guns would not
be a contraband-specific device under this definition, although it would
be a weapon-specific device.
Video surveillance, as defined in section (j), also requires elabora-
tion. It is defined to exclude use of a "lawfully positioned" camera to
view or record activities "occurring within the sight or immediate
vicinity of a law enforcement official (or agent thereof) who is aware of
such use."' For example, cameras in police cruisers or on uniform
lapels would not be video surveillance for purposes of the standards. On
the other hand, the camera must be lawfully positioned. Thus, the use of
a camera to view what an undercover agent can see, while normally not
encompassed by this definition, constitutes video surveillance if the
camera has been illegally installed in a house.
The distinction between covert surveillance and overt surveillance
is important for several reasons. Under these standards, post-surveil-
lance notice is not required for overt surveillance, whereas it may be
required for certain types of covert surveillance.'43 Also, covert video
surveillance of nonprivate places is not regulated as strictly as long-term
140. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field test
to reveal whether a substance is cocaine is not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983) (holding that a canine sniff is not a search).
141. See Michael Janofsky, Thousands Seek Permits to Carry ConcealedArms, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 6, 1995, at A14 (reporting that twenty-five states have laws that allow "almost
all" adults to carry concealed firearms, while other states require a showing of "special
need").
142. This definition is consistent with Supreme Court case law holding that one assumes
the risk thatpeople with whom one converses are electronically recording the conversation.
See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (holding that a microphone carried by
an informant does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (holding that risk of a companion reporting to the police is not altered by the use of
electronic equipment).
143. See Standard 2-6.1(d)(v), infra Appendix.
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overt video surveillance.' 44 Finally, brief overt use of telescopic and
illumination devices to view nonprivate activities is not regulated at all,
while covert use of these technologies is.
45
The definitions in sections (a) and (e) resolve close cases in favor of
finding the surveillance to be covert. Consider the use of binoculars
from a police car. One might say such use is overt if there is no attempt
to hide from passersby. However, under this definition, it is covert if the
officer intends that the subject of the surveillance be unaware of the
monitoring and if a reasonable person in the subject's position would be
unaware of it.
The definition of "reviewing law enforcement official" in section (g)
implements the call of general principle 2-6.1(e) for administrative
involvement by recognizing multiple levels of decisionmaking authority.
At a minimum, this definition indicates, there are three such levels: the
observing, or field, officer; an immediate supervisor (perhaps a sergeant
or captain); and the head of the department, who will normally be
politically accountable either through the election or appointment
process. Given the diversity of command structures, 46 it would be
unwise to attempt any more specificity.
Nevertheless, the three basic distinctions are crucial to the standards'
approach to decisionmaking. Generally speaking, under the standards
the field officer is authorized to make decisions about using physical
surveillance technology only when exigent circumstances exist or the
intrusion involved is minor. 14' A high-level department official or a
police supervisor is the authorized decisionmaker in all other situations
144. Compare Standard 2-6.3(c), infra Appendix (covert surveillance) with Standard
2-6.3(b), infra Appendix (long-term overt surveillance).
145. Compare Standard 2-6.5(b)(i), infra Appendix (overt, cursory use of illumination
and telescopic devices) with Standard 2-6.5(b)(ii), infra Appendix (covert use of such
devices).
146. Police organizations can range from a sheriffs office with one or two deputies to
a huge, military-type operation with ranks ranging from patrol officer through sergeant,
lieutenant, captain and chief. See generally ROBERT H. LANGWORTHY, THE STRuCTURE
OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1986).
147. Innon-exigentcircumstances the field officermay, withoutsupervision: (1)install
and monitor tracking devices so long as no entry into a private place is required for
installation, and monitoring of the device does not disclose the contents of a private place,
see Standard 2-6.4(a) - (b), infra Appendix; (2) use illumination and telescopic devices to
observe nonprivate places, see Standard 2-6.5(b), infra Appendix; (3)use detection devices
whenever a warrantless search is permitted by the Fourth Amendment, see Standard 2-
6.6(a)(I)-(iii), infra Appendix, whenever the device is contraband-specific and is not used
to observe a private residence, see Standard 2-6.6(b), infra Appendix, or whenever the
device is weapon-specific and is used in situations that predicate a weapons search, see
Standard 2-6.6(c), infra Appendix.
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in which the Fourth Amendment does not require a judge to be
involved.14
Two final definitions are particularly important to understanding the
regulatory scheme adopted by the standards. The first is the definition
of "private" in section (f), which simply consists of a cross-reference to
case law and to the factors listed in general principle 2-6.1 (c)(ii). This
definition is designed to indicate which situations implicate the Fourth
Amendment, and thus trigger either the warrant and probable cause
requirements or, in the case of checkpoints, other special protections.'49
While amorphous, the definition does at least identify the universe of
variables that might be considered in making this elusive determination.
Furthermore, the second sentence of this definition states that, where the
standards refer to a place, the area is "private" if physical entry into it
would be considered a Fourth Amendment search. Thus, when the
phrase "private place" is used (in connection with tracking and detection
devices 5 °), Fourth Amendment protection extends to houses, luggage,
and similar items regardless of whether steps have been taken to ensure
privacy or the other considerations found in Standard 2-6.1(c)(ii).
The definition of "legitimate law enforcement objective" in section
(d) is closely connected to the definition of "private." Throughout the
standards, the propriety of surveilling a nonprivate area, activity, or
condition depends on whether the surveillance is "reasonably likely to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.'' In other words, this
phrase provides the standard that police must meet in those situations not
governed by the Fourth Amendment. For obvious reasons, these
situations have received little attention from the courts. 5 Thus, the
language of Standard 2-6.2(d) introduces a new regulatory concept.
This concept has two essential elements. First, it incorporates the
general principle in Standard 2-6.1(a) that all surveillance should be for
an investigatory, deterrent, preventive, or protective purpose. 3
148. See supra note 136.
149. See Standard 2-6.6(a)(iv), infra Appendix.
150. See Standards 2-6.4(a) & 2-6.6, infra Appendix.
,151. See, e.g., Standard 2-6.3(c), infra Appendix (covert video surveillance) and
Standard 2-6.4(b), infra Appendix (monitoring of a tracking device).
152. Butsee Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (permitting sobriety checkpoints that are "reasonable
alternatives"to othermeans of deterrence); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987)
(holding that searches of probationers' homes need not be based on probable cause but
rather could occur under a statute requiring only "reasonable grounds").
153. Typically, these purposes relate to criminal activity. However, there may be some
situations when surveillance can legitimately be used to prevent harm not associated with
crime. For instance, an officer monitoring a video camera panning a public street might
observe apedestrian bend over in an ambiguous but disconcertingmanner, certainly the use
of a zoom capability to see if the person is in distress is legitimate in this situation.
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Surveillance for ends that are purely political, or for the purpose of
harassment, does not pursue a legitimate law enforcement purpose.154
The second essential element is the "reasonably likely" criterion. As
defined in section (d), this language requires "articulable reasons" for
concluding that, through the surveillance, an offense will be discovered,
come closer to being solved, or be deterred, or a harm will be prevented.
At first glance, this definition may look like the reasonable suspicion
standard defined in Terry v. Ohio,' which requires "specific and
articulable" facts as the basis for a stop or frisk. 56 Note, however, that
what is required here is not a finding that a particular person will be tied
to a particular crime (which is individualized suspicion), but rather
articulable reasons that the surveillance will further investigative,
deterrent, or protective ends.
Suppose, for instance, that police want to videotape the people who
go into a suspected crack house. They are likely to have little or no
suspicion with respect to any given individual who is observed, but they
may well have an articulable reason for believing the videotape will help
accomplish an investigatory end if covert, or a deterrent end if overt. Or
suppose police want to use binoculars to observe, without being
discovered, an area known for dangerous drug trafficking. There may be
no suspicion with respect to any particular person observed, but there
may be an articulable reason for concluding that useful information will
be obtained or that the protection of officers who enter the area will be
enhanced.
Although it thus does not require as much of a showing as reason-
able suspicion, the "reasonably likely" language requires that the police
articulate their objectives. Generally speaking, it was the intent of the
Task Force that investigative objectives should be driven by aparticular
offense or type of offense, rather than a generalized concern about crime,
and that deterrence objectives be associated with a significant, demon-
strable crime problem. Without these limitations, all police surveillance
could be said to have an articulable basis, since regardless of the location
or time, there is always a slim possibility that some sort of crime or event
of future evidentiary significance will occur.
Thus, while the phrase "reasonably likely" may permit video
surveillance of the public space in front of a federal building, it does not
permit surveillance of a public park simply to have a record of who was
154. See WESTrN, supra note 1, at 128-29 (describing the use of surveillance to extract
pay off money, learn the plans of opposing politicians, monitor political protest groups, and
eavesdrop on attorney-client conversations).
155. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
156. Id at 21 (holding that the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts" which warrant the intrusion).
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there on a particular day. While using an Intelligent Transportation
System to locate vehicles near the scene of a robbery might be "reason-
ably likely" to achieve an investigatory purpose, flying over large
stretches of territory with a magnification camera to locate marijuana
patches is not. Individualized suspicion is not required, but something
more than a "Let's-see-what-we-can-find-here" attitude is." 7
Nor should the mere assertion that surveillance will deter crime
satisfy the definition. Presumably, overt surveillance by camera, plane,
or other device would deter crime in any targeted area. However, unless
the crime problem is significant, such surveillance is usually not
legitimate under this definition." 8 To conclude otherwise would permit
constant surveillance of virtually all nonprivate areas, with substantial
detriment to privacy (in the sense of repose and anonymity), freedom of
association, and most importantly, freedom from a sense of oppression.
In short, the definitions of legitimate law enforcement objective (i.e.,
investigation, deterrence, prevention, protection from crime, and
apprehension of criminals) and of how likely the achievement of that
objective must be (i.e., when there are articulable reasons) are meant to
provide meaningful, but at the same time relatively minimal, limitations
on police conduct.
D. Standards Governing Specific Types of Surveillance
The final four standards provide specific guidelines for each of the
five physical surveillance technologies.'59 As noted earlier, these
standards represent application of the general principles, particularly
Standard 2-6.1(c), setting out the competing law enforcement and
privacy interests that must be balanced, and Standard 2-6.1(e), dealing
with the appropriate decision-maker. Conversely, the general principles
concerning implementation and accountability are replicated in the
specific standards only when special considerations arise. In other
words, when a specific standard states the conditions under which a
given type of surveillance "is permissible," it is assumed that, in addition
to the requirements listed in the standard, law enforcement officials will
conduct surveillance in a nondiscriminatory manner, adhere to legitimate
157. As one court put it, "Law enforcement agencies should not have carte blanche
power to conduct indiscriminate surveillance for unlimited periods of time of varying
numbers of individuals." United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977).
158. In some cases, authorities may wish to use overt (deterrence-driven) surveillance
not because there have been a significant number of crimes in the targeted area, but because
the few crimes that might occur will cause significant damage. The decision to set up
cameras in Atlanta during the Olympics is a good example of this reasoning.
159. Illumination and telescopic devices are treated together. See Standard 2-6.5, infra
Appendix.
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objectives, appropriately document the surveillance, and so on. As with
the discussion of the general principles, the specific standards will only
be outlined here; discussion of the most controversial issues is left to Part
III.
Standard 2-6.3, concerning video surveillance, contains three
sections. Section (a) governs video surveillance of private locations,
activities, and conditions. In accord with the holdings of most courts,
this section places the same restrictions on video surveillance that are
imposed on interception of private communications."6 Since the ABA's
standards governing communications surveillance are currently being
revised,' the final content of section (a) is still unspecified, although it
is clear that nonconsensual, non-exigent video surveillance of private
areas will require a warrant based on probable cause.
Section (b) governs long-term overt video surveillance of nonprivate
areas (e.g., cameras on telephone poles). This type of surveillance only
need be reasonably likely to achieve legitimate law enforcement
objectives. However, this determination must be made by either "a
politically accountable law enforcement official or the relevant politi-
cally accountable governmental authority." Moreover, "the public to be
affected by the surveillance" must be notified of "the intended location
and general capability of the camera and [given] the opportunity, both
prior to the initiation of the surveillance and periodically during it, to
express its views of the surveillance and propose changes in its execu-
tion, through a hearing or some other appropriate means." Note that the
standard limits public involvement to those "affected by the surveil-
lance." This group would include those who live in or frequent the area
to be surveilled but not the entire public, which might be insensitive to
the intrusion represented by camneras in someone else's neighborhood. 62
Section (c) governs all other video surveillance, meaning short-term
overt video surveillance of nonprivate areas (e.g., videotaping a rally)
and all covert video surveillance of nonprivate areas (e.g., installing
hidden cameras to capture a pawn shop thief). Here too, meeting the
160. See LAFAVE, supra note 24. A few courts have held that only selected aspects of
Title III apply to video surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d
248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986). For instance,
the provisions of Title III that require applications to be signed by certain types of
prosecutors and which limit electronic surveillance to certain crimes may not apply to video
surveillance. For criticisms of these cases, see Kent Greenfield, Comment, Cameras in
Teddy Bears: Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1045 (1991); Cheryl Spinner, Comment, Let's Go to the Videotape: The Second
Circuit Sanctions Covert Video Surveillance of Domestic Criminals, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
469 (1987).
161. See supra note 12.
162. Note, however, that use of video surveillance in one area might merely displace
activity to another, a possible argument for involving additional members of the public.
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"reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective"
test is sufficient. However, the standard contemplates that in all non-
exigent circumstances - in other words, most of the time - the
decision as to whether this requirement is satisfied should be made by a
supervisory official, not a field officer.
Standard 2-6.4, on tracking devices, also has three sections. Section
(a) covers the installation of tracking devices. When such installation
requires non-consensual entry into a private place, a law enforcement
official must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the object to be
tracked is in the place entered and that subsequent monitoring of the
device will reveal evidence of a crime. The one exception to this rule is
when the installation is "part of a systemwide program authorized by the
legislature," a phrase meant to exempt installation of transponders in
connection with Intelligent Transportation Systems; in this situation,
legislative authorization is sufficient. An installation that does not
require entry into a private place (e.g., placement of a beeper on the
exterior of a car'63 or in an item belonging to the government) 64 need
only meet the legitimate law enforcement objective test.
Section (b) governs the use of a tracking device to monitor move-
ment. When the device is used "to determine whether or where the
device is located within a particular private location," probable cause is
required unless one of the subjects of the monitoring consents. In the
latter case, and in all other cases of monitoring, the legitimate law
enforcement objective test applies.
The practical effect of this standard is that police contemplating
long-term, non-consensual tracking will often need probable cause
because of the likelihood that, over an extended period, the tracked
object will enter a home or similar private area. Of course, nothing in
this standard prevents police with only an articulable law enforcement
objective from using a device to track an item to a particular house.'65
163. Cf Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974) (holding that taking paint
scrapings from the exterior of a car does not infringe an expectation of privacy).
164. Cf United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304,1310-11 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
monitoring of a beeper placed in government-owned property which a suspect then steals
is not a search).
165. Both United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984), appear to hold that using a beeper to discover in what building an item is
located (as opposed to its precise location) is not a search. In Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285, the
beeper led police to a cabin but did not reveal movement of the beepered container within
the premises. In Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21, the beeper led police to a warehouse full of
lockers, but did not reveal which locker contained the beeper. In neither situation did the
Court find that the Fourth Amendment was implicated. Apparently, the rationale is that no
personal right is violated until the police discover that the item is in a specific area
associated with a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Clifford Fishman, Electronic
Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still
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However, if the signal on a beeper is lost while the beeper is in a public
place, probable cause is required to relocate the signal in a private place.
Probable cause is also required if public tracking leads the police to an
apartment building or a complex of buildings, so that identifying the
precise apartment or building within which the item is located is
impossible without resort to the tracking device. 66 For these reasons,
under this standard seeking a warrant prior to tracking would often be the
safest course even if installation in a private place is not required. 67
Section (c) provides that when either installation or monitoring
requires probable cause a judge must authorize that action in writing,
except when there are exigent circumstances, in which case a judge
should be consulted as soon as practicable. A court order may authorize
monitoring for a maximum of sixty days "absent articulable facts
demonstrating a need for longer surveillance." Extensions of sixty days
may be authorized by a judge.
Standard 2-6.5 concerns illumination and telescopic devices. It is
the most straightforward standard. For surveillance of private areas it
requires probable cause and, in non-exigent circumstances, a warrant;
it otherwise mandates adherence only to the legitimate law enforcement
test. The one exception to the latter rule is when surveillance of
nonprivate areas is "overt and not prolonged with respect to any given
area," in which case no justification is necessary. Thus, the use of a
Startron nightscope to look through a darkened bedroom window while
hiding in bushes at the edge of a property would require probable cause
and, unless exigency existed, a warrant, while the covert use of binocu-
lars to observe a public square would only need to be reasonably likely
to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective, and the cursory use
of a flashlight to illuminate bushes in a park or the exterior of a house
would require no justification.
Standard 2-6.6 governs the use of detection devices. It consists of
four sections. Section (a) concerns all detection devices, general and
specific. In contrast to the rules governing other types of physical
surveillance, a search of a private place using these devices is permitted
on less than probable cause in a wide variety of situations, including
whenever circumstances authorize a search incident to arrest, a search
based on consent, an inventory search, a protective frisk, a search of an
Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 341-46 (1985).
166. Karo stated that the use of a beeper to determine that a container is in a particular
locker would be a search. See 468 U.S. at 720 n.6.
167. The government complained about this consequence in Karo, 468 U.S. at 718
("[F]or all practical purposes [agents] will be forced to obtain warrants in every case in
which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no way of knowing in advance whether
the beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside private premises.").
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entryway prior to an emergency entry, or a protective sweep of an
arrestee's premises. In short, such devices may be used in any situation
in which Fourth Amendment law allows a search on less than probable
cause. 6 Further, the standard permits detection devices to be used at
fixed checkpoints that serve "a compelling government interest" in
preventing passage of contraband or weapons, as well as at temporary
checkpoints when there is reasonable suspicion that the checkpoint will
discover a person or instrumentality threatening "a substantial risk of
death or bodily harm," or will discover a person or persons being
threatened, as in a kidnaping victim.'69 Finally, when a detection device
search does require probable cause, the standard eliminates the warrant
requirement not only in exigent circumstances, but also when the place
searched is associated with a "lesser expectation of privacy" (e.g., a
car).170
Certain limitations are placed on detection-device checkpoints in
Section (a)(iv). As with the rules governing long-term public video
surveillance, a fixed checkpoint established to detect contraband or
weapons must be approved by "an appropriate politically accountable
law enforcement official or governmental authority"; further, the public
affected by such a checkpoint must be notified of the location and be
given periodic opportunities to express its views. A temporary check-
point must be approved by a supervisory law enforcement official;
additionally, the anticipated size of the group subjected to the checkpoint
should be "reasonable in light of the purpose for which the device is to
be used."
Section (b) of the detection device standard sets out additional
situations in which detection devices that are contraband-specific may
be used. Because these devices detect only contraband, their use is
permitted whenever reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective, even if the use entails search of a private place.
The one exception to this rule is when the device is used to search a
"place of residence," in which case probable cause (and a warrant in
168. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to arrest);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (search upon consent); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(protective frisks); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (unannounced entry);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (protective sweep incident to arrest).
169. Cf Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(commenting how he would "candidly strive hard" to uphold a roadblock to save a kidnap
victim even though the police had to "search every outgoing car," as "it might be reasonable
to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life").
170. See Califomiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,393 (1985) (noting a reduced expectation
of privacy due to regulation of vehicles).
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non-exigent circumstances) is required.' If the use of the device
requires a seizure, grounds for the seizure must exist.'72
Section (c) concerns weapon-specific devices. Unless these devices
can be classified as contraband-specific (e.g., a gun-detection device in
those jurisdictions where carrying a concealed weapon is illegal), this
section subjects weapon-specific devices to the same restrictions as
general detection devices. There is one exception: weapon-specific
devices can be used in any circumstance in which protective action is
permitted, "even absent any individualized suspicion of danger that
otherwise would be required." Thus, if grounds for a stop are present,
a weapon-specific device could be used to conduct an electronic "frisk"
even if no suspicion of danger exists. When the search is narrowed to
what a weapon-specific device detects, the fact that the officer does not
actually harbor a suspicion of danger does not bar the search, despite the
rule of Terry v. Ohio,73 because the only intrusion into privacy is to
identify whether there is potential danger.'74 For the same reason, this
provision permits, without any articulable suspicion of danger, the use
of a weapon-specific device to "look" beyond an entrance prior to an
authorized entry, and to observe the vicinity of an arrest subsequent to
the arrest. 7 Again, the theory is that in contexts where protective action
would be authorized based on individualized suspicion, a device that
detects only weapons can be used even absent that suspicion because it
merely ensures that the protection occurs.
Finally, section (d) provides that law enforcement agencies should
adopt procedures that address three implementation concerns. To the
extent detection devices have the ability to "electronically strip"
passersby,'7 6 procedures should be developed to allow the exposure of
171. Cf United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 140 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(inveighing against giving the police "free rein" to use such techniques to pry into the
home).
172. As delineated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny.
173. 392U.S. at30 (permitting a friskwhen the officer "reasonably [concludes] in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous").
174. Further, the electronic frisk will usually be less intrusive than the traditional one.
See infra note 284.
175. Because a post-arrest sweep of the immediate vicinity of the arrestee is already
permitted in the absence of suspicion of danger, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334
(1990), this provision adds nothing to law enforcement authority. Buie also permitted a
protective sweep of other areas on the premises associated with a reasonable suspicion of
danger. See id. Standard 2-6.6 would not permit entry into the surrounding area on less
than reasonable suspicion, but it would allow beaming the device into the area from the
point of arrest.
176. Although it does provide images of the body, the Millitech device described earlier,
supra note 118 and accompanying text, purportedly does not reveal "intimate anatomical
details." Dr. G. Richard Huguenin, Millitech Corporation, Testimony to the Crime and
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anatomical information only to officers of the same gender. This section
also cautions police against inappropriate use of "active" devices that
may, through x-ray or other technology, cause physical harm to the
target.' Finally and most importantly, it states that procedures should
be adopted "to ensure that the capabilities of any device used conform
as closely as possible to the authorized objective or objectives of the
surveillance." If the objective in using a detection device is to find
weapons, a weapon-specific device is preferable; if such a device is
unavailable, police should use a general detection device that will
achieve the objective with as little revelation of other information as
possible.'78
IV. AREAS OF CONTROVERSY
The foregoing description might have created the misleading
impression that the discussion of the Task Force proceeded smoothly
from one stage to another in crisp logical order. In fact, the group
progressed in fits and starts, often backtracking. Preliminary versions of
the specific standards were developed before the general principles were
complete. Sections were added, deleted, and then added back in again;
even the categories of physical surveillance subject to regulation
changed.'79 Moreover, as might be expected within such a diverse
group, 80 serious disagreements emerged. Indeed, virtually every
provision of the standards was the subject of a debate over the two years
of the project. Occasionally the Task Force came to an impasse, broken
only at later meetings after further reflection.
The discussion below summarizes the most contentious debates,
divided into twenty-one topics. It also provides, in more detail than
previous parts of this Article, the rationale behind the provisions
ultimately produced by the Task Force. In the end, all of these issues
were resolved, if not to the complete satisfaction of each member of the
Criminal Justice Subcommittee ofthe House Judiciary Committee 3 (July 21,1994) (on file
with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology). More powerful imaging techniques
could reveal such details.
177. Devices that rely on radiation could be harmful under certain circumstances. See
id. at 1.
178. This provision implements the least intrusive means principle of Standard 2-
6.1(c)(iv).
179. See supra note 104.
180. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy ofPrivate
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995) (describing the dynamics of deliberations
within American Law Institute rulemaking bodies).
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Task Force, then at least sufficiently to permit each member to endorse
the Tentative Draft.
Several issues debated by the Task Force could be termed "funda-
mental," in the sense that a failure to resolve them would have grounded
the project. These issues, divided into four categories, are canvassed
first; the rest of the Task Force's debates are discussed in the order in
which they are raised by the standards.
A. Fundamental Issues
1. Mission Impossible: Technological Changes Will Render the
Rules Moot
One objection to any project to develop rules governing
technologically-assisted physical surveillance relies on the constant
evolution of technology. Any effort at regulation, a few Task Force
members initially argued, will soon be rendered obsolete by new
developments in the field. Just as current detection devices were
unimaginable thirty years ago, new devices that we cannot anticipate and
therefore cannot intelligently regulate will be developed.
For a number of reasons, the Task Force quickly decided that this
concern should not give it pause. First, inaction would only make
matters worse. Legislative and administrative law in this area is almost
non-existent, and courts' attempts to fill the void have been haphazard
at best.' At the same time, the use of advanced technology to conduct
physical surveillance is no longer an occasional occurrence; federal and
state agencies use sophisticated illumination, telescopic, and detection
devices with increasing frequency.' Devising some type of regulatory
framework, even one that will require revision in the near future, is better
than ignoring this burgeoning dimension of police investigation.'83
Second, regardless of the technology involved, law enforcement
needs (e.g., investigation and deterrence) and individual interests (e.g.,
privacy and freedom of association) do not change appreciably over
time. New technologies might increase the tension between these needs
181. See supra Parts I.A & I.C.
182. See supra notes 2 & 3. See also Brave New World, TIME, Mar. 3, 1997, at43
(describing new surveillance technology currently available).
183. See ARTHuR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 123 (1971) ("It would be
unwise to deal with each new technological application on an individual basis divorced from
the broader issues, or to delay until its privacy-invading excesses have come to pass.");
Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE U.
581,584 n.14 (1984) (reviewing MARKG.YuDoF, WHENGovERNmENTSPEAKS: POLMCS,
LAW AND GovERNMENTEXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983)) ("The fact that the danger has
not made itself manifest does not mean that the danger does not exist.").
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and interests, but would not diminish their fundamental relevance.
Moreover, when new developments have necessitated new legal
frameworks, the Fourth Amendment and related legal concepts have
proven remarkably adaptable.'84
Third, the decision to structure the standards around functional
categories (e.g., tracking devices, telescopic devices, and detection
devices) significantly mitigates the consequences of failing to anticipate
a particular technology. These categories should encompass most new
developments in physical surveillance.
2. Guidelines vs. Rules
A second core issue, which was not as easily resolved, concerned
whether the Task Force's standards should be general guidelines or
precise rules. This discussion, which persisted over several meetings,
reflected the age-old debate whether law is best encapsulated in general
or specific terms;' in particular, it flowed from two concerns about
rules. The first concem was that detailed rules would not accommodate
technological developments as easily as general guidelines. The second,
and more vigorously pressed, concern was that precise rules are easy to
violate inadvertently and thus more likely to lead to litigation and
obstacles to legitimate law enforcement.
Opposing members of the Task Force believed that a project that
produced only vague guidelines would not be worth the effort. Without
relatively specific rules, they argued, the message of the standards would
be muddled. At the least, this group felt the standards should strongly
urge the police to produce specific rules.
In the end, the standards do not reflect the triumph of one of these
positions over the other, but rather a compromise between the two. The
general principles of Standard 2-6.1 are more like guidelines, while the
remaining standards more closely resemble rules. However, even the
latter standards are broad in scope. Most obviously, the multi-factor
definition of privacy and the relatively open legitimate law enforcement
objective test leave considerable room for discretion. In a number of
other standards, the Task Force again opted for language that avoids
184. For instance, the advent of wiretapping and bugging initially created difficult
analytical problems for the Supreme Court, since conversations are not "persons, houses,
papers or effects" and cannot be "seized" in the same way these items can. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347,365-66 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Katz
majority's adoption ofa privacy analysis allowed constitutional regulation of an investiga-
tive technique not anticipated by the Framers. See id. at 353.
185. CfDuncanKennedy, Form andSubstance inPrivateLawAdjudication, 89HARv.
L. REV. 1685 (1976) (exploring the advantages and disadvantages of clear but rigid rules
and amorphous but adaptable standards).
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straitjacketing law enforcement.'86 But at the same time, Standard 2-
6.1(g) admonishes law enforcement agencies to devise more specific
rules implementing these standards.
3. Fourth Amendment Redux or Comprehensive Effort?
A third basic issue was raised by the suggestion from some members
of the Task Force that the group merely try to summarize Fourth
Amendment law, without reaching subconstitutional issues. As with the
argument in favor of guidelines, this stance was motivated by a desire to
avoid undermining legitimate law enforcement efforts.
The response to the latter argument was less equivocal, however. As
the preceding description of the standards makes clear, the Task Force
made an effort to tackle all the issues raised by law enforcement use of
physical surveillance, notjust those addressed by courts. The Task Force
concluded that it could not justify the implication of a simple summary
of Fourth Amendment law: that the vast amount of surveillance not
meeting the "search" threshold'87 should not be regulated at all. For
instance, given its Orwellian overtones, most people would probably
agree that placement of video cameras on street comers requires some
type of limitation, despite its apparent immunity from constitutional
strictures.'88 Similarly, as Part II.C explained, a number of issues
regarding implementation and accountability are not addressed by
constitutional doctrine, but are important to any comprehensive
regulatory system.
Furthermore, the seemingly simple goal of describing current Fourth
Amendment law on physical surveillance may not be achievable, for
even when courts have regulated technologically-assisted physical
surveillance, their holdings have not been models of clarity. The
Supreme Court alone has proffered several different analytical ap-
proaches.' 9 When one looks at lower courts, the variety in holdings and
rationales assumes bewildering proportions. For example, some courts
186. See infra text accompanying notes 209-16 (notice), 217-25 (disclosure and
retention of records), 226-31 (documentation of surveillance decisions), & 232-33 (public
dissemination of types of surveillance conducted).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, With Success of Cameras, Concerns Over Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B4 (describing the questionable efficacy of cameras in some
areas and the concerns of some civil libertarians about an Orwellian society); Timothy Egan,
Police Surveillance ofStreets Turns to Video Cameras and Listening Devices, N.Y. TMES,
Feb. 7, 1996, at A12 (discussing, inter alia, concerns about video viewing of homes,
maintenance of recordings, and audio capability).
189. See supra Part II.A.
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have concluded that thermal imaging of a building requires a warrant,"9
while others have declared that this activity does not even implicate the
Fourth Amendment.' Similarly, some courts have held that the use of
binoculars to look inside a building is a search,"9 while others have said
it is not. 3
In short, legislators, policymakers, police, attorneys, and trial judges
need more guidance than presently provided on both constitutional and
subconstitutional issues. The standards endeavor to provide that
guidance, both with specific rules and with a statement of the competing
values at stake.
4. The Relationship of Public and Private Surveillance
A fourth fundamental issue was whether the restrictions placed on
the police should be greater than those placed on the public. According
to one view, if a private citizen can use a video camera to record activity
on a public street with no restrictions, the police should be able to do so
as well. Because private surveillance of public places is virtually
unregulated, the practical consequence of this position is almost identical
to the stance that standards should reflect only Fourth Amendment law.
One response to this position is, rather than foregoing restrictions on
the police, to limit all technologically-assisted physical surveillance,
public and private. After all, use of these devices by fellow citizens can
have a significant impact on privacy and freedom of action. Further-
more, private use of physical surveillance technology has increased
enormously in recent years. Indeed, corporate and personal use of video
cameras, telescopic devices, and other types of physical surveillance
technology is probably outpacing use by the government. Perhaps the
model provided by communications surveillance law, which bars the
private use of communications interception equipment, 94 should be
followed here as well.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); see also
infra note 281.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594 (D. Or. 1996); United States
v. Penny-Feeny, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226-28 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds, 984
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
192. See, e.g., People v. Oynes, 920 P.2d 880 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Carter,
790 P.2d 1152 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
193. See, e.g., People v. Amo, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1979).
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1994) (outlawing manufacture, distribution, possession, and
advertising of certain wire, oral, or electronic communications surveillance devices).
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Nonetheless, with one possible exception,'95 the standards do not
attempt to control the private use of physical surveillance devices. 6
Given the legitimate purposes that such devices may serve, and their
prolific usage by the general population, any attempt to achieve such
control in a sensible manner would be a significant undertaking best left
to other groups.
197
Thus the question for the Task Force remained whether the standards
should impose limitations on activity by the police that ordinary citizens
can perform with impunity. For instance, though use of Startron
binoculars to peer into a private area might trigger a tort or privacy law
action,'98 surveillance of public areas is not likely to bring any legal
sanction. Accordingly, some members of the Task Force wondered why
police should have to abide by even minimal restrictions on their
surveillance of public places.
The Task Force concluded, however, that the government's vast
resources and its power to deprive people of freedom distinguish it from
private actors. The Bill of Rights limits state action, not private action."9
Put another way, a democratic government must trust its citizens in order
to earn its citizens' respect. 200 The government shows no trust if it
indiscriminately uses its power against the citizenry. Regardless of what
195. At present, the Electronic Surveillance Standards recommend the imposition of
criminal penalties for the "possession, sale, distribution, advertisement or manufacture of
a device the design or disguise of which makes it primarily useful for the surreptitious
overhearing orrecording of... communications." Electronic Surveillance Stap dards, supra
note 7, Standard 2.1(b)(iv). Given the linkage imposed by Standard 2-6.3(a) between video
surveillance of private locations and the Electronic Surveillance Standards, a person who
possesses avideo device designed primarily for covertobservation ofprivate activities (e.g.,
a teddy bear camera) or who uses such a device covertly might be commitdng a crime. In
light of this possible result, whether the Task Force will retain this linkage remains to be
seen.
196. Theproposed standards avoid explicitly addressing governmentuse ofinformation
collected through private physical surveillance. Cf United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984) (discussing when replication of a private search by a public actor is a Fourth
Amendment search); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (same).
197. The ABA Criminal Justice Section Council has just established a Task Force on
Policing Privatization, which might consider such issues. Letter from Michael Johnson,
Chair, Criminal Justice Standards Committee, to Members, Policing Privatization Task
Force (Apr. 9, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology).
198. "Several successful actions for invasion of privacy have been brought against
defendants who have utilized secret video cameras, see-through panels, peepholes, hidden
microphones, or window-peeping." H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner,
Criminalizing Invasion ofPrivacy: Taking a Big Stick to Peeping Toms, 52 J. Mo. B. 345,
346 (1993).
199. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
200. Cf Sundby, supra note 124, at 1755 (1994) (arguing that the fundamental purpose
ofthe Fourth Amendment and of "maintaining a constitutional system" is the promotion of
"government-citizen trust").
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private individuals may be able to do, self-interest mandates that the
government refrain from arbitrary, unjustifiable surveillance."'
B. General Principles
5. Is Privacy Invasion All We're Worried About?
The Task Force expended considerable energy on the phrasing of
sections (a) and (b) in Standard 2-6.1 - which state the reasons why
physical surveillance technology is needed and why it may need to be
regulated - because these sections set the stage for the rest of the
standards. This effort was aimed at making these important sections as
comprehensive and clear as possible. There was little disagreement
about content.
However, one substantive issue did arise in connection with section
(b). The penultimate draft of this section included a more detailed
recitation of values that might be diminished by unregulated physical
surveillance. In addition to talking about the "chilling effect" that
technologically-assisted physical surveillance might have upon
"constitutionally protected activities, such as freedom of speech,
association, or travel," the earlier draft stated that regulation is needed
when such surveillance would pose "a significant infringement of other
widely shared values in a democratic society, including the enjoyment of
anonymity and places of repose, the absence of a pervasive police
presence, and the absence of intensive official scrutiny except in
response to suspicious conduct.""2 2 Some members of the Task Force
successfully objected to the inclusion of this language on the ground that
it was too vague and might lead to the regulation of innocuous law
enforcement behavior. Because the deleted language captures interests
that are not clearly encompassed by the privacy concept, this objection
came close to reprising the idea that the standards should deal only with
Fourth (and First) Amendment concerns.
201. This reasoning might suggest that the standards should govern all government use
of technologically-assisted physical surveillance. However, such surveillance comes in
many guises that are not subject to easy categorization: secret service agents charged with
protecting federal officials; national security organizations designed to ferret out terrorists;
regulatory bodies obligated to monitor public health and safety; and transportation and court
agencies concerned with protecting those who use their facilities. Rather than address the
complex issues that arise in these varied contexts, the introduction to the standards will
make clear that the term "law enforcement" as used in the standards is meant to encompass
only the last-named area plus typical police and detective work.
202. Standard 2-6.1(b) (draft of Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology).
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The practical effect of the deletion is probably trivial, however.
Very little technologically-assisted physical surveillance is left unregu-
lated by the specific standards. 3 While much surveillance may take
place upon the minimal showing required by the legitimate law enforce-
ment objective test, this test, along with the implementation and
accountability provisions, imposes some limitations on even routine use
of surveillance devices in nonprivate areas. Furthermore, the current
phrasing of section (b) refers not only to privacy and First Amendment
freedoms, but also to the "openness of society" as a value worthy of
protection.
6. Should the Use of the Least Intrusive Device be Required?
When deciding whether a particular type of surveillance should take
place, some members of the Task Force thought that the use of the least
intrusive technique should be mandated, or at least strongly encouraged.
As technological advances make more intrusive surveillance alternatives
available, these members argued that the need to avoid "investigative
overkill" becomes greater." Further, while previously the most
intrusive alternatives were also the most time-consuming and expensive
ones - so that the least intrusive alternative was typically selected as a
matter of efficiency - technology now provides options that are highly
intrusive but relatively inexpensive and not manpower intensive. For
instance, putting a cop on every comer is fiscally impossible for most
jurisdictions; putting a camera on each block may not be.
At the other end of the spectrum, some members of the Task Force
expressed significant antipathy toward any reference to the least intrusive
means concept, noting that the Supreme Court has explicitly refused to
endorse this requirement in the Fourth Amendment context.0 5 They also
voiced concern that such a limitation would require police to make
difficult decisions about relative intrusiveness which might relegate
investigative effectiveness to a secondary role. For instance, how does
one evaluate whether a video camera on a telephone pole is less intrusive
than a police officer on every street comer, and of what relevance is the
fact that the latter method of surveillance is much more expensive?
203. The only obvious example is overt, unprolonged use oftelescopic and illumination
devices. See Standard 2-6.5(b)(I), infra Appendix.
204. See supra Part I.
205. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) ("The reasonableness of
any particulargovernmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence
ofaltemative'less intrusive' means."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,556
n.12 (1976) ("The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise
insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.").
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The Task Force decided that Supreme Court case law, as well as
pragmatic law enforcement and economic considerations, require a
measured approach. Thus, the standards indicate that relative intrusive-
ness should be a consideration but not a dispositive criterion, in selecting
a particular technology." 6 Further, relative intrusiveness is to be
evaluated in light of other "available effective and efficient
alternatives"2 7; law enforcement is not required to sacrifice effectiveness
or to ignore resource constraints in deciding whether a particular
surveillance technique is permitted.0 8
7. Should People Know They've Been Watched?
Under both the Electronic Surveillance Standards2" and federal
law,2"0 post-surveillance notice of wiretapping and bugging must be
given to all those listed on the warrant application. Initially the Task
Force's standards mandated the same requirement for all covert physical
surveillance that requires probable cause (e.g., surveillance of the interior
of a home).2 ' As in the communications surveillance context, 21 the
206. See Standard 2-6.1(c)(iv), infra Appendix.
207. Id.
208. For a critique ofthis approach, see Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis,
63 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1173 (1988).
209. Standard 5.14 of the Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, provides:
As soon as practicable but not later than ninety days after the
return is made to the judicial officer... the judicial officer should
cause to be served on the person named in the order of authorization
or approval or the application for such an approval ... an inventory
which should include notice of-
(i) the entry of the order or the making of the application;
(ii) the date of the entry of the order or of the denial of the
application;
(iii) the period of authorized, approved or disapproved over-
hearing or recording;
(iv) the overhearing or recording, if any, of communications;
and
(v) the period, if any, of actual overhearing or recording.
Upon a showing of good cause made to the judicial officer, the
serving of the inventory should be postponed.
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1994).
211. See Standard 2-6.1(d)(iv)(B) (draft of Nov. 16, 1996) (on file with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology).
212. The commentary to the PROJECr states:
The possibility of surreptitious surveillance is, of course, the most
telling objection to any system of permissive use. An inventory
procedure removes most of the source of that objection. When an
individual receives the inventory he will, moreover, then be in a
position to take whatever action is available to him to suppress, if
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primary reason for this rule was that the intrusion associated with such
surveillance is significant, yet usually undiscovered by the target unless
prosecution takes place. Even when a warrant is sought and a judge
reviews the surveillance decision, a notice requirement provides effective
disincentives to questionable conduct because the police know their
targets are more likely to learn of misconduct. When the surveillance
does not require a warrant, a notice requirement is even more important
because no one will discover any abuse of discretion unless prosecution
takes place, in which case the effect of hindsight bias will often favor the
police." 3 As noted earlier,214 notice in probable cause situations might
even be constitutionally required under Berger v. New York." 5
However, some members of the Task Force and several police
organizations were worried that post-surveillance notice would burden
law enforcement, or prematurely alert a suspect and foil an investigation
(especially in conspiracy and similar investigations). The latter concern
could presumably be addressed through language, like that found in
electronic surveillance laws, that allows post-surveillance notice to be
postponed for good cause." 6 Nonetheless, the Task Force decided that
the standards should merely require "reasonable notice" of covert
surveillance and that the commentary to the standards should flesh out
the competing interests involved.
8. Disclosure and Retention of Surveillance Results
The recording ability of physical surveillance technology, particu-
larly in connection with video surveillance and Intelligent Transportation
Systems, raises the potentially difficult issues of disclosure and retention.
Consider two examples in addition to those given earlier.17 First,
suppose the government conducts surveillance of a business to determine
whether drug importation laws are being violated. Assuming the
surveillance is legally justified, the use of any information obtained is
certainly permissible in a criminal prosecution on drug importation or
possible, the evidence obtained orto recover, where appropriate, civil
damages.
PROJECT, supra note 7, at 161-62 (citation omitted).
213. Cf JEROME SKOLNICK, JusTIcE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIErY 221, 223-24 (2d ed. 1975) (noting that when searches uncover
incriminating evidence, courts' perceptions of the reasonableness of such searches shift in
favor of the police).
214. See supra text accompanying note 133.
215. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
216. Standard 5.14 oftheElectronic Surveillance Standards permits postponementupon
"a showing ofgood cause," see supra note 208, requiring law enforcement to show how the
inventory will damage an investigation.
217. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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related charges. However, the information might also be sought by other
government agencies (e.g., an environmental protection unit), by
competitors, or by private news organizations. As another example,
suppose a school's video surveillance tapes of its halls are sought by
police investigating criminal activity." 8 Should disclosure be automatic
in these situations? If not, what rules should govern the disclosure and
retention of surveillance records?
Because these questions involve obtaining pre-existing information,
they are best answered by standards governing transactional
surveillance.2 9 However, the Task Force believed that the physical
surveillance standards should at least touch upon the disclosure and
retention issues for two reasons. First, the propriety of a search or seizure
depends in part upon what is done with the information obtained. Even
if the police have probable cause to search a house, a decision to display
all of its contents in the public square is unreasonable. Second,
dissemination of information is itself an invasion of privacy. Such
dissemination may be permissible if consistent with the purpose of a duly
authorized search, but a violation of privacy rights may occur if the
information obtained is used for other purposes.
Starting from this premise, an earlier version of the standards
provided that disclosure of surveillance results "should be permitted only
for purposes consistent with the purpose of the surveillance or those
collateral uses determined to be lawful by previously promulgated
statute, court decision or regulation." '  The rationale for this approach
is threefold: (1) legislative, judicial, or agency action is more likely to
be based on consideration of all the complex state and individual
interests involved;22' (2) disclosures motivated by discriminatory or
vindictive motives are less likely; and (3) judicial review of any
disclosure decision is facilitated. 2
An earlier version of the standards also proposed that records should
be destroyed after being used for their intended purpose or when that
218. This issue was expressly avoided by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. TL.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985).
219. For a definition of this term, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
220. See Standard 2-6.1(d)(vi) (draft of Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology).
221. As the Court recognized in Michigan Dep't ofState Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
453-54 (1990), the reasonableness of a search is significantly enhanced if the governing
rules come from legislative or high administrative officials rather than the street police
themselves, and if the police are given relatively little discretion in construing these rules.
222. See Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the
Fourth Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REv. 49, 85-92 (1995).
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purpose is "no longer likely to- be achieved." ' This provision was based
on a similar rationale. If a duly promulgated law requires retention of the
records, presumably some public debate about the propriety of such
action has taken place. However, if no such law exists then the proposal
would have required their destruction in the indicated circumstances.
Fearful of extensive video libraries that would retain information on vast
numbers of individuals in perpetuity, some members of the Task Force
argued that even this protection was not enough and that records should
be destroyed after a fixed time, regardless of their potential use.
All of these proposals were rejected by the Task Force because they
might prohibit or render impossible the use of highly probative informa-
tion simply because the use was not anticipated by law. Accordingly, the
language submitted to the Criminal Justice Section Standards
Committee"4 merely required that disclosure be "for lawful purposes,"
which suggests that disclosure and retention are permitted so long as not
prohibited by a statute or regulation. The Committee added the word
"designated" before the word "lawful" to indicate that, contrary to the
Task Force's formulation, some legal authorization should exist, at least
for disclosure.225 However, given the ambiguity of the word "desig-
nated," such legal authorization might consist simply of a directive by a
supervisor to disclose particular information.
A final related issue should be noted. Assuming that adequate
protection against inappropriate disclosure to non-law enforcement
entities exists, a few members of the Task Force argued that if these
disclosure rules are strictly adhered to, other restrictions on covert
surveillance could be minimized. This position assumes that the
surveillance itself, because undetected by the targets, does not harm any
individual interests, and that disclosure of results, because limited to law
enforcement purposes and other authorized objectives, does not harm
innocent people.
The second assumption, at least, is erroneous. Even if the surveil-
lance results are used only against the guilty, the knowledge that the
government is conducting covert surveillance without restraint would
ultimately affect everyone's sense of security. Further, if information is
223. See Standard 2-6.1(d)(vii) (draft of Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology) ("Protocols should be developed for the destruction of
surveillance records not required to be maintained by law. Such records should be
destroyed (A) after they are used for their intended purpose, or (B) when that purpose is no
longer likely to be achieved.").
224. Recall that the Committee is the first layer of review in the ABA's standards review
process. See supra note 14. In its February, 1997 meeting, the Committee began its
discussion ofthe standards. The change reported in the text below was one outcome of this
meeting.
225. See Standard 2-6.1(d)(vi), infra Appendix.
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disclosed for purposes other than law enforcement, even if pursuant to
a pre-existing rule, the privacy of innocent people may be infringed.
Thus, while proper precautions regarding disclosure can minimize the
injury to privacy, they do not obviate the need for standards requiring
justification for a particular surveillance.
9. Is Documentation Necessary to Articulation?
When surveillance is based on probable cause, the reasons for the
surveillance will normally be documented in a warrant application and
thus be available for judicial or administrative review. 6 However, for
searches conducted without a warrant due to exigent circumstances, no
such application will exist and a separate written record of the decision
to search may not be created. Law enforcement officers are even less
likely to record their reasons for acting when subconstitutional conduct
not requiring probable cause is involved.
To ensure that the reasons for surveillance are "articulated" when a
warrant is not required and to assist in periodic review of surveillance
usage, some members of the Task Force proposed a documentation
requirement. Thus, an earlier version of the standards provided for
documentation identifying the official or officials responsible for the
decision to conduct particular surveillance." Moreover, this earlier
version required that the reasons for the surveillance be documented,
except when the surveillance decision was made by a field officer and
the surveillance was "cursory. 228
This earlier version was rejected in favor of the current formulation,
which requires administrative rules to ensure that "the information
226. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 4L
227. See Standard 2-6.1(f)(I) (draft ofFeb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Journal
of Law and Technology).
228. See Standard 2-6.1(f)(ii) (draft ofFeb. 10,1997) (on file with the HarvardJournal
of Law and Technology). The relevant text read:
(f) Accountability and Control. Government officials should be held
accountable for use of regulated technologically-assisted physical
surveillance technology by means of:
(i) Documentation ofthe official or officials responsible for the
decision to conduct particular surveillance.
(ii) Documentation of the reasons for the surveillance. Where
the final decision to conduct particular surveillance is made by
anonsupervisory law enforcement officer, and the surveillance
is not cursory in nature
(A) that officer should make a contemporaneous record
articulating the basis for undertaking the surveillance and
noting the duration of the surveillance, and
(B) such records should periodically be reviewed and
evaluated by a supervisory law enforcement officer.
[Vol. 10
HeinOnline  -- 10 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 436 1996-1997
No. 3] Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance 437
necessary for [official] accountability be maintained." '229 Again, the
concern that onerous, litigation-producing, and perhaps useless burdens
might be placed on law enforcement officers won the day over the more
stringent rule. For instance, some members of the Task Force thought
requiring field officers to record every prolonged use of binoculars
would not appreciably protect privacy but could lead to obfuscating
defense objections when such records were incomplete or non-existent.
The current language is thus not as specific as the earlier version
regarding the precise information that must be maintained. However, it
does require departments to keep some accountability information,
perhaps at least a record of how a particular surveillance was conducted
and of who conducted it.
On the issue of accountability, early on the Task Force unanimously
agreed that exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy only when
the Fourth Amendment is violated. In all other situations, disincentives
should depend upon administrative and other sanctions. Thus, the
standards do not impose a statutory exclusion remedy of the type found
in the original version of the Electronic Surveillance Standards23 ° or Title
111.231
10. Giving Away Police Secrets
Considerable debate focused on whether law enforcement should
periodically disseminate to the public statistics about the frequency of
technologically-assisted physical surveillance, as it must under the law
governing wiretapping and bugging.232 On the one hand, the public and
its representatives cannot intelligently assess the scope and impact of
technologically-assisted physical surveillance without information of this
sort. On the other hand, law enforcement agencies do not want to alert
potential criminals to specific techniques; indeed, there is perhaps an
inclination on the part of law enforcement to keep the public ignorant of
229. See Standard 2-6.1(f)(I), infra Appendix.
230. See Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, Standard 2.3(c) (permitting
a suppression motion by "any party aggrieved by the overhearing, recording, use, or
disclosure of such communications or evidence derived therefrom"). An earlier version of
this standard that required exclusion only when "substantial rights" are violated was
removed by the 1986 amendments.
231. Title III requires exclusion in a number of situations in which the Fourth
Amendment probably would not. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1994) (allowing exclusion
for failure to disclose to the judge the interception of communications not related to the
offense specified inthe wiretap order"as soon as practicable"); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (1994)
(allowing exclusion for failure to seal recordings); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1994) (allowing
exclusion for failure to provide an inventory at least 10 days before trial).
232. See supra note 101.
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the use of covert surveillance technology. 3' As a compromise, the
current standard requires public dissemination of the frequency of use in
terms of the general surveillance categories created by these standards
(e.g., private video surveillance, public video surveillance, and tracking
devices). Particular technologies need not be revealed.
C. Definitions
11. The Legitimate Law Enforcement Objective Standard
Part II demonstrated that the Fourth Amendment imposes no
limitations on many types of surveillance of public places." Nonethe-
less, earlier versions of the standards endorsed a reasonable suspicion
requirement in a number of public surveillance contexts.3" Behind these
restrictions was the belief that surveillance of public activity could have
particularly intrusive or oppressive consequences in these situations. 6
However, as noted earlier,2" many members of the Task Force thought
that, given the courts' lack of action in this area, such surveillance should
be essentially unregulated. The compromise which emerged was the
"reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective"
test, which is meant to impose minimal, but meaningful, justificatory
conditions on surveillance of nonprivate areas."
233. See Richard McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and
Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA.L. REV. 297, 328 n.145 (1985) (noting the
difficulty ofdetermining how often beepersurveillance occurs given the lack ofrecords and
the reluctance of police to keep or disclose such records).
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. See Standard 2-6.3(c) (draft of Aug. 5, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Journal
of Law and Technology) (requiring, with respect to covert video surveillance, either
reasonable suspicion or documentation of the "expected frequency" of the "particular type
of criminal activity" and "that other methods of deterrence would be less effective");
Standard 2-6.4(b)(ii) (draft of Oct. 28, 1996) (on file with the HarvardJournal ofLaw and
Technology) (requiring reasonable suspicion for the monitoring of a beeper in nonprivate
areas); Standard 2-6.5(b) (draft of Aug. 5, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law
and Technology) (requiring reasonable suspicion for the use of illumination and telescopic
devices to view nonprivate areas).
236. For instance, because targets are unaware of its occurrence and thus cannot take
steps to minimize exposure, covert surveillance may well reveal far more intimate detail
than overt video surveillance. For discussion of the rationale for imposing a reasonable
suspicion requirement in connection with the tracking of public movements, see infra note
268.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 187-93.
238. For an argument that reasonable suspicion should be required for surveillance
"intrusions" amounting to less than a Fourth Amendment search, see Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990).
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Although this phrase requires that the law enforcement objective be
"articulable," some members of the Task Force believed that the standard
was still too amorphous. In an effort to make the test somewhat more
restrictive and concrete, one version of the definition explicitly required
that the police be able to articulate a particular crime or type of crime
they hoped to deter, prevent, or investigate, or a "substantial" crime
problem that required deterrence. 9 The Task Force was concerned,
however, that such an addition might prevent clearly reasonable
surveillance (e.g., use of video cameras to scan the Olympic Park in
Atlanta). At the same time, it directed that the commentary to the
definition endorse particularity and substantiality as two of the criteria
for determining reasonableness. 240
12. The Definition of Privacy
Much discussion centered around how the Task Force should define
those situations that warrant the first tier of protection (i.e., those that
require probable cause). For instance, an early version of the standards
referred to the first-tier domain as a "home or similar location. 24'
Another approach discussed, but never put into draft language, required
justification based on the sophistication of the device in question.
However, the Task Force, like the courts, came to see privacy as a multi-
factor concept, and thus ultimately defined privacy by simply listing
relevant considerations. Although this approach obviously lacks the
clarity that the Task Force had hoped to provide, the group concluded
that it was the best way to define privacy: there are simply too many
permutations involving technology to permit bright-line statements about
239. See Standard 2-6.2(e) (draft of Oct 28, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Journal
of Law and Technology). The relevant text read:
(e) Legitimate law enforcement objective. Investigation, deterrence
or prevention of an offense defined by statute, and prevention of other
physical harm. An action by a law enforcement officer is "reasonably
likely to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective" if there are
articulable reasons for concluding that the action will:
(i) discover the commission of a particular offense or type of
offense;
(ii) further an ongoing investigation of a particular offense or
type of offense;
(iii) deter or prevent a particular offense;
(iv) deter a significant number of offenses in a given area; or
(v) prevent one or more persons from suffering serious physical
harm.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
241. See Standards 2-6.3 to 2-6.7 (draft of Oct. 28, 1996) (on file with the Harvard
Journal ofLaw and Technology).
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activities or conditions that deserve the Constitution's greatest protec-
tion.
Consider one illustration of the problem. As indicated above, one
possible definition would have been to declare the interior of the home
and similar locations "private," thereby dictating that such locations can
never be observed without probable cause. While this approach would
be easy to apply and would even come close to describing Fourth
Amendment law, it would foreclose - unless probable cause existed -
enhanced surveillance from a public sidewalk of activity taking place
directly in front of uncurtained windows and open front doors, even if
only a flashlight or video camera was used in the observation. Although
there are good reasons to be reluctant to give much weight to such
circumstances,24 both case law and logic demand that they be given
some effect. Thus, the definition adopted incorporates the courts'
admittedly vacillating positions on what is private and what is not.243
D. Video Surveillance
13. Unresolved Issues Involving Surveillance of Private Locations
Because the ABA's revised standards on communications surveil-
lance have yet to be finalized, section (a) of the video surveillance
standard, which equates video surveillance of private locations with
interception of private communications, leaves a number of questions
unanswered. Four issues are canvassed here, but are not resolved.
First, should there be a provision regulating the installation of
surveillance devices? Both the Electronic Surveillance Standards and
Title III avoid the issue. Further, in Dalia v. United States,244 the
Supreme Court explicitly held that a separate warrant is not required for
an entry to install eavesdropping equipment, although the entry must be
"reasonable." '245 Yet a good argument can be made that the Fourth
Amendment requires a probable cause finding that non-consensual entry
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. Another regulatory approach would be to prohibit certain types of surveillance in
certain situations (e.g., no satellite surveillance of homes, no use of detection devices to see
through clothing). Given society's willingness to permit electronic eavesdropping, which
may be even more intrusive than the examples just given, this categorical approach seems
overly restrictive. That being said, it should be noted that the flexible approach adopted
here is not necessarily inconsistent with barring the most intrusive types of surveillance or
making them extremely difficult to justify. In other Nords, application of the factors in
Standard 2-6.1(c) might lead to a conclusion that certain types of surveillance are not
justified by any legitimate law enforcement objective.
244. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
245. See id. at 258 (holding that "the manner in which a [surveillance] warrant is
executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness").
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into a home is necessary to gather criminal evidence, whether in the
communications or physical surveillance context.
Second, the Electronic Surveillance Standards246 and Title 111247 state
that a wiretap order may not be issued unless ajudge finds that normal
investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or are likely to be
unsuccessful or too dangerous. This "necessity" requirement was
designed to keep electronic surveillance a last resort, given its intrusive-
ness.2 48 With the advent of video surveillance, however, it is not clear
how the necessity requirement works. As currently written, the
Electronic Surveillance Standards require the police to use video
surveillance (presumably with no audio capability) before resorting to a
wiretap or a bug. Yet visual surveillance can be as intrusive or more
intrusive than aural surveillance.249
A third issue of this sort concerns minimization. The current ABA
standards on aural surveillance state that the judicial order authorizing
surveillance shall contain "a directive that overhearing or recording shall
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the overhearing or recording
of conversations not otherwise subject to overhearing or recording. 250
Federal law is similar in vein,"' although the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of this provision significantly emasculates even this relatively vague
246. See Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, Standard 2-5.4(c) (requiring
a finding that "other investigative procedures have or had been tried and have or had failed
or reasonably appear or appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to have been or to be
too dangerous").
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b) (1994) (requiring a finding that "normal investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
or to be too dangerous").
248. As the commentary to the PROJECT indicates, the Supreme Court itself states in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), that a special showing is "more important in
eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures
of search and seizure are utilized." PROJECT, supra note 7, at 140.
249. But this is not necessarily the case, depending upon what is viewed or heard. This
is why the proposals that place greater limitations on video surveillance are also suspect. But
see Greenfield, supra note 158, 1057-77 (suggesting, inter alia, (1) that video surveillance
should be authorized for fewer types of crimes than is the case with aural surveillance, (2)
thatvideo surveillance should be permitted only ifaural surveillance first indicates criminal
activity is occurring, (3) that video surveillance should be permitted only if the judge
identifies the person to be observed (which is required for aural surveillance only if the
person is known), (4) that the court order for video surveillance should be of shorter
duration, and (5) that warrantless video surveillance ought to be prohibited even when one
of the parties consents to it).
250. Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, Standard 2-5.8(1).
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994) (stating that electronic surveillance "shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter").
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prohibition. 2 Are these provisions sufficient for accomplishing
minimization of video surveillance or should they be more detailed for
both aural and video surveillance (i.e., by requiring termination of
surveillance when no one reasonably suspected of criminal activity is
being surveilled, and allowing only spot checks thereafter)?
Finally, both the Electronic Surveillance Standards and federal law
exempt from regulation the interception of communications involving a
party who has consented to the interception.z" As applied to video
surveillance, on its face this provision's requirement that the consenting
party be present during the surveillance prohibits the use of a "teddy bear
camera" to observe a babysitter while the parents are gone. Moreover,
this provision requires termination of warrantless video surveillance if
the consenter leaves the room during a transaction. At the same time,
eliminating the presence requirement might allow the owner of a house
to authorize surveillance of the activities of guests which he or she does
not personally observe. Even guests have expectations of privacy that
should be considered reasonable, especially when, for instance, they are
alone in a guest room or reasonably assume the owner has left the
premises."
14. To What Extent Should the Public Be Involved in Authorizing
Video Surveillance of the Public?
Several members of the Task Force wondered whether involving the
public in the implementation of long-term video surveillance of public
areas (and detection device checkpoints) was necessary given the fact
that politically accountable officials are already involved in the decision.
The Task Force decided that although this latter input might be sufficient
in many instances, the public should be given the opportunity to register
its views. Both from philosophical and practical standpoints, govern-
ment searches that affect large groups of people should be mediated
through the public process. 5 Involvement of the public affected by the
252. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978) (holding that a bad faith
failure to minimize does not violate the statute because the focus should be "on agents'
actions not their motives").
253. See Electronic Surveillance Standards, supra note 7, Standard 2-5.1; 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1994).
254. At least one court has held that even the presence of a consenting party during
surveillance does not vitiate Fourth Amendment protection. See United States v. Shabazz,
883 F. Supp. 422 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that warrantless audio and video surveillance
of a suspect's room violates the Fourth Amendment even though conducted only while a
conseriting informant is in the room).
255. Cf William Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L.REv. 553,588-89 (1992) (arguing that cases like Martinez-iFuerte
and Sitz, which leave checkpoints to departmental discretion, nonetheless seem to suggest
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surveillance can act as a check on elitist decision-making, provide useful
information as to the scope of the problem, encourage a sense of
community involvement, and diminish the discomfort associated with the
surveillance by increasing understanding of its nature and purpose.
On the other hand, the Task Force rejected the suggestion that the
public be permitted to "veto" particular video surveillance. 6 Such a
provision was deemed both unworkable and unnecessary. Determining
when the public had "vetoed" surveillance would be difficult; at the
same time, overwhelming public aversion to particular cameras would
presumably persuade the police department and city council to back
down without formally gauging whether a veto has taken place. 7
A related issue concerns what the public should be told about
proposed video surveillance. Some members of the Task Force believed
that the precise capabilities of the cameras, including magnification and
audio capability, ought to be disclosed. Other members, echoing the
arguments against periodic public dissemination of specific physical
surveillance information,"8 argued for a less revelatory approach. The
Task Force ultimately concluded that the public should be informed of
the "intended location and general capability of the camera." 9 By using
the words "general capability," the standard conveys that not every
technical aspect of the camera need be disclosed to the public.
that where group stops are involved "politics provides an adequate remedy for overzealous
police action; groups ... unlike the solitary suspect, can protect themselves from
overzealous police tactics at the polls").
256. See Jennifer Granholn, Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality
of Invisible Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 687, 711 (1987).
257. In some jurisdictions, video cameras have been removed after public outcry.
Associated Press, Spying Fears Get Cameras Removed, GAINESVILLE Sun, June 20, 1996,
at lB (reporting that five cameras being used to monitor traffic were removed); Barbara
Yaffe, Ontario Zaps Big Brother's Photo Radar, EDMONTON J., June 24, 1995, at C3
(reporting that citizens voted fora local politician who promised to remove "the government
eyeball on provincial roadways"). To some extent, the hostility in these cases may have
stemmed from the fact that the cameras effectively caught speeders.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
259. See Standard 2-6.3(b)(ii)(A), infra Appendix.
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E. Tracking Devices
15. When Is Probable Cause Required for Tracking?
Legal regulation of tracking devices is derived largely from two
Supreme Court cases briefly described earlier."' In United States v.
Knotts,26" ' the Supreme Court held that using a beeper to track a car
through public streets is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
According to the Court, it is not reasonable to expect privacy with
respect to one's route or destination when traveling on the roadways.262
In contrast, in United States v. Karo,263 the Court held that the use of a
beeper to locate an item inside a particular house is a search, and that
judicial authorization for such a search is required. However, the
warrant need not state with particularity the place to be "searched" by the
beeper when, as will usually be the case, that place is unknown.'
Further, the Court left open whether reasonable suspicion (as opposed to
probable cause) is sufficient to authorize the warrant.265
Despite objections from law enforcement organizations, the Task
Force opted for the probable cause standard whenever a tracking device
is used to locate an item or person within a private location.266 The
intimation of Karo notwithstanding, the Court has firmly stated in other
contexts that a Fourth Amendment search outside of the weapon frisk
and "special needs" scenarios requires probable cause.267 In this
260. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. Title II mentions tracking devices, but
does not seriously regulate them, merely providing that "[i]f a court is empowered to issue
a warrant or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may
authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that
jurisdiction if the device is installed in that jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (Supp.
1996). This provision allows beepers authorized in one jurisdiction to be used in other
jurisdictions.
261. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
262. See id. at 282.
263. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
264. See id. at 718.
265. See id. at 718 n.5.
266. Note thatthe word "location" is used in the standard, ratherthan the word "place."
As defined in Standard 2-6.2(f), a private place is one which, if entered physically, would
be entitled to a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. It is possible
thatvarious locations within such a place are not protected by the Fourth Amendment when
viewed from the outside, without a physical intrusion. Indeed, this possibility is recognized
in Karo, when the Court states that the use of a beeper to see a container is the equivalent
ofan entry only if the government "employs an electronic device to obtain information that
it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage ofthe house." 468 U.S.
at 715.
267. Whereas a frisk forweapons only requires reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), and a special needs search (e.g., an administrative or regulatory
search) need only be "reasonable" under the circumstances, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
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situation, the tracking device functions like a device that sees through
walls, because it allows the police to determine precisely where an item
is and, by inference, where the person who carried the item is. The Task
Force concluded that such an intrusion necessitates justification at the
probable cause level.
Although the standard also provides that public tracking need only
meet the legitimate objective test," the practical impact of this standard
is that probable cause will usually be required for long-term tracking." 9
Several factors mitigate the burden on law enforcement in that regard,
however. First, precisely because the destinations of the device are not
known, probable cause here focuses solely on the likelihood that
evidence will be discovered; as Karo indicates, the place ultimately to be
searched need not be stated with particularity. Second, if the device is
installed in an illicit item (such as a bale of marijuana or a car that is later
stolen), such probable cause will generally readily be found because,
once acquired, possession of the item is a crime." Third, paragraph (c)
sets out an exigency exception to the court order requirement, which
applies whenever there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant. Finally,
under provision (b)(i), if a person agrees to be "bugged," a consent
exception to the warrant and suspicion requirements exists.
U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student's purse), a typical search requires probable cause. See,
e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1987) (holding that probable cause is
required to view serial numbers on a stereo and specifically rejecting a reasonable suspicion
standard for "cursory" searches); Ybarrav. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-94 (1979) (holding that
probable cause is required to search a person unless there is present danger).
268. See Standard 2-6.4(b)(ii), infra Appendix. Some members of the Task Force,
echoing several commentators, contended that reasonable suspicion was the appropriate
standard in this context. They argued that public tracking infringes privacy, the interest in
anonymity, and freedom of travel, in a way that typical naked-eye viewing does not - it
allows continuous long-term monitoring of the particular routes traveled; the starting,
stopping, and intermediate points of the travel; and the contents of one's car or suitcase.
See McAdams, supra note 232, at 311 ("because [without a beeper] the combination of
these elements will be unknown to any single person in almost every case, the driver's
privacy remains secure"); Wayne R. LaFave, Nine Key Decisions Expand Authority to
Search andSeize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1740 (1983) (noting that in cases where there is no
surveillance, "only an army of bystanders, conveniently strung out on the route and who not
only 'wanted to look' but also wanted to pass on what they observed to the next in line"
would truly invade the driver's privacy interest and expectations). The Task Force also
noted that this type of physical surveillance is more intrusive than other types of covert
surveillance of public activity (e.g., using video cameras, telescopic, or illumination
devices); the latter types of surveillance are usually relatively brief and in any event focus
on one particular area.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
270. Cf CLIFFoR S. FISHMAN &ANNET. McKENNA, WIRErAPPING & EAVESDROPPING
§ 28.10 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that tracking devices placed in packages mailed from overseas
containing contraband require no warrant).
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16. Duration of the Court Order
Under Title III, a wiretap order is valid for thirty days.27 An early
version of the standards set this time limit on tracking orders as well.27
However, many knowledgeable members of the Task Force claimed that
such a limitation on the use of beepers and other tracking devices would
be impractical in this context. For instance, in an effort to ferret out the
identity and location of as many members of a drug ring as possible,
tracking often might continue over months or even years. Thirty days
was therefore seen as unreasonably short.
Yet as several courts have recognized,273 and as Karo itself
indicates, 4 without some limitation, tracking surveillance becomes an
extreme intrusion, potentially amounting to weeks of surveillance
apparently justified solely by the mere hope that useful information will
be produced. The time period ultimately chosen (sixty days) is identical
to the durational limitations on court orders for "pen registers" under
Title 11. 275 Because of the great likelihood that a tracked item will end
up in a private location during an extended period, an officer contemplat-
ing using a tracking device in this situation would be well-advised to
seek a warrant, with its attendant durational limitation.
F. Illumination and Telescopic Devices
17. The Confirmation Exception
Some courts have permitted the use of telescopic and illumination
devices to observe the inside of a house if an inadvertent naked-eye
sighting gives police reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking
place and the enhanced surveillance is necessary to confirm that
suspicion.276 This "confirmation" exception to the usual probable cause
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994).
272. See Standard 2-6A(c) (draft of Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Journal
of Law and Technology).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1149 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 151 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Cf United States v. Long, 674
F.2d 848, 852 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding that a warrant that allows beeper use for ninety
days is permissible if the beeper is only used for seven days).
274. According to Karo, to obtain a warrant for a tracking device the government must
identify the object into which the beeper is to be placed, explain the circunstancesjustiying
installation of the beeper, and state the length of time it is required. United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 708, 718 (1984).
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c)(1) (Supp. 1996). A pen register records numbers dialed
on a telephone without overhearing verbal communications. Its use is not a Fourth
Amendment search. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
276. See supra note 62.
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requirement could arguably be justified by the need to immediately
confirm or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity. Such a situation
might occur, for instance, if an officer on the street sees what looks like
a drug deal taking place in a second story window and uses binoculars
or a nightscope to verify or dispel the suspicion.
One version of Standard 2-6.5 recognized this exception if "the
observation is from a lawful vantage point, of brief duration, and focuses
solely on the area necessary to confirm reasonable suspicion acquired
from that vantage point that evidence of crime will thereby be discov-
ered."277 Ultimately, however, the Task Force deleted this provision. In
the usual confirmation situation, the activity or condition observed with
the enhancement device will be legitimately observable on no suspicion
(at least as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned) because it is not
"private." For instance, using binoculars to confirm the naked-eye
sighting in the foregoing example would generally not constitute a
search, because the subjects are observable through a window. In
situations where this is not the case, the danger is that the exception will
permit intrusive surveillance on less than probable cause, in contraven-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. For instance, under this exception, a tip
providing reasonable suspicion that gambling is currently taking place in
a particular house could be said to give the police authority to use a
telescopic device to look at documents inside the house and determine
whether they are racing forms.27 The Task Force decided that the
traditional warrant/exigent circumstances formulation adequately
balanced law enforcement and privacy interests in this context.
G. Detection Devices
18. Are Heat Waves "Abandoned"?
Because general detection devices reveal more than just contraband
or weapons, Standard 2-6.6(a) requires that their use be justified by
probable cause or one of the well-recognized exceptions to the probable
cause standard.279 Probably the most controversial use of detection
devices aimed at private places is thermal imaging, which permits law
enforcement officials to identify heat sources within a building, and thus
facilitates location of drug laboratories or in-house marijuana farms. A
277. See Standard 2-6.5(a)(iii) (draft of Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology).
278. But cf United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (holding that the
use ofa telescope to observe illegal gambling, including reading material, inside a high rise
apartment requires probable cause).
279. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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majority of courts have held, and some members of the Task Force
argued, that the use of such a device to determine the heat output of a
private place is not a search, because it merely detects heat "waste" that
has been "abandoned" by the house occupant.28
The Task Force ultimately adopted the contrary position, persuaded
by the Tenth Circuit's initial reasoning on this issue.28' As that court
indicated, heat waves that emanate through the walls of a house are
similar to the sound waves picked up by a microphone.28 In both
instances, it is the source of the waves, not the "abandoned" waves, that
interests the police. Further, because even relatively primitive thermal
imaging devices can resolve heat differentials as small as one-half of a
degree,283 they have the potential for discerning a variety of activities
associated with an expectation of privacy.
19. Are General Detection Devices Too General?
It could be argued that the use of general detection devices should
always require probable cause (even if a recognized exception to
probable cause exists) because they often reveal more than would a
traditional, legitimate physical search. To illustrate, suppose the police
have grounds to frisk a suspect or search the immediate premises
surrounding an arrestee based on a reasonable suspicion of danger. A
detection device that can "see" into containers might easily reveal more
than a traditional search in these situations.284
Although no Task Force members took the position that the use of
general detection devices should always require probable cause, several
280. Some of these courts also analogize thermal imaging to the use of a dog to detect
drugs, which the Supreme Court indicated is not a search in United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983). See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.
1994). However, thermal imaging is clearly not a contraband-specific technique, and thus
Place is inapposite here.
281. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 83 F.3d
1247 (10th Cir. 1996). On rehearing en banc, the court held that there was probable cause
for the wan-ant that eventually issued, absent any consideration of the thermal imaging, and
refused to reach the issue of whether the use of the thermal imaging constituted a search.
Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250.
282. See id. at 1502.
283. See Matthew L. Zabel, A High-Tech Assault on the "Castle ": Warrantless
Thermal Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 267, 269 (1995).
284. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court suggested
that an officer can pat down the outer clothing but should generally not reach into pockets
or beneath garments unless a weapon-like item is felt. Id. at 29-30. In practice, however,
a frisk is likely to be much more intrusive. See JONATHAN RuBINsTEIN, CITY POLIcE 310-
11 (1973) (describing the probing nature of the typical frisk taught at police
academies).
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expressed concern about the potential for "overbroad" searches. The
detection device standard nonetheless incorporates all of the traditional
exceptions to the probable cause requirement for three reasons.28 First,
the use of a detection device permits the officer to remain a safer
distance from the suspect. Second, it avoids the need for highly intrusive
placement of hands over the suspect's entire body. Third, it identifies
weapons and other items with greater certainty and locates them with
greater precision. Thus, post-frisk searches into clothing will be fewer
in number and more limited in scope. Similarly, in home entry situa-
tions, the use of detection devices might dissipate the fear of danger, so
that "no-knock" entries will become unnecessary. In protective sweep
situations, detection devices will give the officer a more definite reading
concerning others on the premises and will decrease the chances of a
dangerous surprise confrontation.
Nonetheless, it remains possible that the use of general detection
devices in these situations could disclose more private information than
the typical search or frisk, especially when the devices supply images
rather than simply detect characteristics of items. In recognition of this
fact, the Standards Committee added the provision that procedures
should be adopted "to ensure that the capabilities of any device used
conform as closely as possible to the authorized objective or objectives
of the surveillance."2 6 This provision means that if the police must use
a general detection device, they should use one that will achieve their
objective with as little revelation of other material as possible." 7
20. Should Specific Devices Be Immune from Regulation?
Conversely, the issue of whether there should be any limitations on
contraband- or weapon-specific devices was also debated. Some
members of the Task Force felt that police should be able to aim a device
that detects only weapons at anyone they choose, based on the intimation
in United States v. Place288 that if a device detects only contraband its
use entails no search because it discovers nothing of private
significance." 9 The Task Force ultimately rejected this stance because
of the fact that in many states a weapon is not contraband.2' Instead the
Task Force distinguished between weapon-specific and contraband-
285. See Standard 2-6.6(a)(ii)-(iii), infra Appendix.
286. See Standard 2-6.6(d)(iii), infra Appendix.
287. See supra text accompanying note 178. For an argument against the approach
endorsed by the standards and in favor of a reasonable suspicion requirement for use of
detection devices in non-checkpoint situations, see Harris, supra note 119.
288. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
289. See id. at 707.
290. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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specific devices, to allow the use of the former whenever police may
validly look for weapons (e.g., in frisk situations) but to prevent their
random, suspicionless use except when weapons are in fact contraband
(as in airports or in jurisdictions that make carrying a concealed weapon
a crime). 9'
A related argument, made by a sizeable segment of the Task Force,
was that if a device is truly contraband-specific its use should never
require justification. The case for this position is especially strong if the
device is deployed surreptitiously and relies on technology that causes
no physical or other harm. However, the group ultimately decided that
when surveillance is of the home the use of such a device generally
should require probable cause.2' The Task Force concluded that at least
one place of ultimate repose should be maintained, sacrosanct from
suspicionless invasion regardless of the precision that technology
affords.2" Some members may also have been influenced by the reality
that devices that can see through walls are unlikely to detect only
contraband and that, even if they did, they could easily be used in a
discriminatory fashion that would be particularly repugnant when aimed
at the home.
21. Fixed Checkpoints and Compelling Govemment Interests
The Supreme Court has upheld the use of checkpoints to address
significant crime problems like illegal immigration294 and drunk
driving.295 This fact, combined with the relatively nonintrusive nature of
detection devices (i.e., the fact that they allow police to avoid physical
touching), led several members of the Task Force to argue that fixed
checkpoints using detection devices should be permissible upon a
relatively meager showing of need. So, for example, if a neighborhood
is experiencing a surge in violent crime, police should be able to set up
detection device checkpoints to detect and deter the importation of
weapons into the neighborhood.
While not fully addressing the propriety of such usage, the language
adopted by the Task Force clearly imposes more stringent limitations on
291. See Standard 2-6.6(b)-(c), infra Appendix.
292. See Standard 2-6.6(a)-(b), infra Appendix.
293. Cf Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The
Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1120 (1996) (arguing
against suspicionless "surgical" searches ofcomputers designed to obtain only information
about illegal activity on the ground that "[tjhe values of one's home and office as a
psychological refuge and as a source of power independent of the government represent a
pair of interests protected by the property-model of the Fourth Amendment").
294. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
295. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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checkpoints than does Supreme Court case law. Not only does Standard
2-6.6(a)(iv) require the involvement of politically accountable officials
(a requirement arguably dictated by the Court's decisions)," 6 it also
requires that the public affected by the checkpoint be involved in the
decision (which is clearly not mandated by Court rulings). Additionally
the standard requires a finding that the checkpoint serve "a compelling
government interest that no contraband pass by that checkpoint" or "a
compelling government interest that no weapons pass by that checkpoint
into a place where the presence of weapons would be extraordinarily
hazardous." '97  Use of the word "compelling" in these provisions
conveys a requirement that the checkpoint be the least intrusive, effective
way of achieving a government aim of great magnitude, as with
checkpoints at prisons, borders, court buildings, and airports. The Task
Force concluded that such language was necessary because checkpoints
usually involve a seizure of some sort, often of large numbers of people,
and because aiming a detection device at individuals is still likely to be
perceived as intrusive, especially when its necessity is not clear.
Returning to the neighborhood weapon detection checkpoint
scenario, establishing such checkpoints on public streets would seldom
be permissible under this standard, even taking into account the fact that
the use of a general detection device would facilitate the checkpoint's
purpose by less intrusive and embarrassing means than conventionally
used. The practice of subjecting everyone seeking to enter a particular
street or residential area to a contraband check is repugnant for several
reasons. First, unlike the four contexts mentioned in the previous
paragraph - where checkpoints do not stigmatize anyone because the
practices have been so long accepted and do not discriminate between
different segments of society - checkpoints on public roads could taint
both the area sealed off and those who enter it. Second, such check-
points would hamper the freedom to travel, which is not an issue in the
context of prisons and public buildings, and which already occurs at
airports and at the border given the need for documentation checks.
Third, the use of such checkpoints could create an atmosphere of
oppression, precisely because it could be equated with prison, border,
and airport situations.
296. See supra note 221.
297. Standard 2-6.6(a)(iv), infra Appendix (emphasis added). Standard 2-6.6(a)(iv)(C)
lays out somewhat different requirements for temporary checkpoints. See supra text
accompanying note 169.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the name implies, the American Bar Association's Tentative
Draft Standards Concerning Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance is a work in progress. Comments on the foregoing material are
encouraged. Final approval by the ABA hierarchy is still some time
away,298 so feedback could have an impact. Indeed, it is anticipated that
the content of at least some of the standards will change prior to their
submission to the House of Delegates.
At the same time, if it has done nothing else, the work of the Task
Force on Technology and Law Enforcement has persuasively demon-
strated that some regulatory structure governing the use of physical
surveillance technology is necessary. This work provides a model for
future attempts to establish guidelines for other types of surveillance, and
for search and seizure regulation generally.
298. As noted earlier, supra note 14, the review process leading to ABA House of
Delegates approval is multi-layered, including two "readings" by the Criminal Justice
Section Council. The first reading will take place in August, 1997. A second reading must
take place before the standards can be forwarded to the House of Delegates.
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APPENDIX:
ABA TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT
TENTATIVE DRAFT STANDARDS CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
As revised after meeting with
Criminal Justice Standards Committee
February 24, 1997
Standard 2-6.1. General Principles
(a) Need for Surveillance. Technologically-assisted physical
surveillance can be an important law enforcement tool. It can
facilitate the detection, investigation, prevention and deterrence
of crime, the safety of officers and citizens, the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals, and the protection of the innocent.
(b) Need for Regulation. Law enforcement use of
technologically-assisted physical surveillance can also diminish
privacy, freedom of speech, association and travel, and the
openness of society. It thus may need to be regulated.
(c) Factors Relevant to Regulating Use of Surveillance.
Whether technologically-assisted physical surveillance should
be regulated and, if so, to what extent should be determined by
the following factors:
(i) the law enforcement interests implicated by the surveil-
lance, including:
(A) the nature of the law enforcement objective or
objectives sought to be achieved;
(B) the extent to which the surveillance will achieve
the law enforcement objective or objectives; and
(C) the nature and extent of the crime involved;
(ii) the extent to which the surveillance technique invades
privacy, which should include consideration of:
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(A) the nature of the place, activity, condition or
location to be surveilled;
(B) the care that has been taken to enhance the privacy
of such place, activity, condition, or location;
(C) the lawfulness of the vantage point, including
whether either the surveillance or installation of
surveillance equipment requires a physical intrusion;
(D) the availability and sophistication of the surveil-
lance technology;
(E) the extent to which the surveillance technology
enhances the law enforcement officer's natural senses;
(F) the extent to which the surveillance of subjects is
minimized in time and space;
(G) the extent to which the surveillance of non-sub-
jects is likewise minimized; and
(H) whether the surveillance is covert or overt;
(iii) the extent to which the surveillance diminishes or
enhances the exercise of First Amendment freedoms and
related values; and
(iv) the extent to which the surveillance technique is less
intrusive than other available effective and efficient
alternatives.
(d) Implementation of the Surveillance. Officers conducting
regulated technologically-assisted physical surveillance should
be governed by the following considerations:
(i) The subjects of the surveillance should not be selected
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
(ii) The scope of the surveillance should be limited to its
authorized objectives and be terminated when those
objectives are achieved.
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(iii) The particular surveillance technique should be capable
of doing what it purports to do and be used solely by
officers trained in its use.
(iv) When a particular surveillance device makes use of
more than one regulated technology and the technologies
are governed by differing rules, the more restrictive rules
should apply.
(v) Reasonable notice of the surveillance should be given
at an appropriate time and in an effective manner.
(vi) Disclosure and use by law enforcement officers of
information obtained by the surveillance should be permit-
ted only for designated lawful purposes.
(vii) Protocols should be developed for the maintenance
and disposition of surveillance records not required to be
maintained by law.
(e) Rule-making and Decision-making Entities. A variety of
entities, including the courts, legislatures, executive officials,
prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and the public, have a
responsibility in assessing how best to regulate the use of
technologically-assisted physical surveillance. The role that
each should play in formulating, monitoring and enforcing
regulatory requirements depends on such factors as the:
(i) legal basis for the regulation;
(ii) invasiveness and urgency of the surveillance;
(iii) need for deference to expertise in law enforcement;
(iv) extent to which local conditions vary;
(v) value of sharing decisionmaking; and
(vi) number of people and size of the geographic area
affected by the surveillance.
(f) Accountability and Control. Government officials should
be held accountable for use of regulated technologically-assisted
physical surveillance technology by means of:
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(i) administrative rules which ensure that the information
necessary for such accountability is maintained;
(ii) in addition to any exclusionary sanction mandated by
the Fourth Amendment or legislation, appropriate adminis-
trative sanctions when rules promulgated pursuant to
Standard 2-6. 1(g) regarding use of technologically-assisted
physical surveillance are violated;
(iii) periodic review by law enforcement agencies of the
scope and effectiveness oftechnologically-assisted physical
surveillance; and
(iv) public dissemination of information about the general
type or types of surveillance being used and the frequency
of their use.
(g) Written Guidance to Law Enforcement Officers. Each law
enforcement agency should develop written instructions
regarding resort to regulated technologically-assisted physical
surveillance and should mandate that officers of that agency
comply with those instructions. These instructions should
include:
(i) the requirements as to specific types of surveillance, as
set out in Standards 2-6.3 through 2-6.6;
(ii) the rules developed by other agencies pursuant to
Standard 2-6.1(e); and
(iii) such other rules as are necessary to implement these
general principles in specific contexts.
Standard 2-6.2. Definitions
The following definitions apply to Standards 2-6.3 through 2-6.6.
(a) Covert surveillance. Surveillance intended to be concealed
from any subject of the surveillance.
(b) Detection devices. Devices used to detect the presence of
a particular object (e.g., explosives, drugs, weapons, or certain
chemicals) or characteristic (e.g., shape, size, density, hardness,
material, texture, temperature, scent) that is concealed behind
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opaque inanimate barriers. Such a device is of the contraband-
specific type if it can only reveal the presence of an object
which it is always or virtually always criminal to possess or use
in the existing circumstances. Such a device is weapon-specific
if it can only reveal the presence of a weapon.
(c) Illumination devices. Devices that make visible details not
visible to the naked eye because of poor lighting conditions.
(d) Legitimate law enforcement objective. Detection, investiga-
tion, deterrence or prevention of crime, protection from harm,
or apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal. An
action by a law enforcement officer is "reasonably likely to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective" if there are
articulable reasons for concluding that one of these objectives
may be met by taking the action.
(e) Overt surveillance. Surveillance of which a reasonable
person would be aware.
(f) Private. An activity, condition or location is private when
the place where it occurs or exists and other relevant consider-
ations, such as those listed in Standard 2-6.1(c)(ii), afford it a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. A
place is private if physical entry therein would be an intrusion
upon a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.
(g) Reviewing law enforcement official. A law enforcement
officer other than the person who will implement the surveil-
lance. Such an officer may be supervisory (e.g., a sergeant,
lieutenant or commander of a district or unit), or politically
accountable (e.g., a department head or a prosecutor). A
supervisory officer should have participated in specialized
training on surveillance techniques and applicable legal
guidelines.
(h) Telescopic devices. Devices that make visible details not
visible to the naked eye because of distance.
(i) Tracking devices. Devices used to track movement of
persons, effects, or vehicles such as beepers, over-the-horizon
radar, and Intelligent Transportation Systems.
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(j) Video surveillance. Use of a lawfully positioned camera as
a means of viewing or recording activities or conditions other
than those occurring within the sight or immediate vicinity of a
law enforcement official (or agent thereof) who is aware of such
use.
Standard 2-6.3. Video surveillance
(a) Video surveillance of a private activity or condition is
permissible when it complies with provisions applicable to
electronic interception of communications [see Standards 2-
_ of this Chapter], as modified for video surveillance.
(b) Overt video surveillance for a protracted period not
governed by Standard 2-6.3(a) is permissible when:
(i) a politically accountable law enforcement official or
the relevant politically accountable governmental authority
concludes that it will:
(A) not view a private activity or condition; and
(B) will be reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate
law enforcement objective; and
(ii) the public to be affected by the surveillance:
(A) is notified of the intended location and general
capability of the camera; and
(B) has the opportunity, both prior to the initiation of
the surveillance and periodically during it, to express
its views of the surveillance and propose changes in its
execution, through a hearing or some other appropriate
means.
(c) All video surveillance not governed by Standard 2-6.3(a) or
(b) is permissible when a supervisory law enforcement official,
or the surveilling officer when there are exigent circumstances,
concludes that the surveillance:
* This provision is subject to change, depending upon the Task Force's proposals
concerning communications surveillance.
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(i) will not view a private activity or condition; and
(ii) will be reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective.
Standard 2-6.4. Tracking Devices
(a) Installation of a tracking device other than as part of a
systemwide program authorized by the legislature is permissi-
ble:
(i) if installation involves entering a private place without
consent, only when there is probable cause to believe that:
(A) the object to be tracked is at the location to be
entered; and
(B) subsequent monitoring of the device will reveal
evidence of crime; and
(ii) in all other cases, when subsequent monitoring of the
device is reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective.
(b) Monitoring of a tracking device is permissible:
(i) to determine whether or where the device is located
within a particular private location, only when there is
probable cause to believe that such monitoring will reveal
evidence of crime, provided that, if one or more of the
subjects of the monitoring consent to have the tracking
device accompany their persons, the monitoring need only
be reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law enforce-
ment objective; and
(ii) in all other cases, only so long as there continues to be
a reasonable likelihood that such monitoring will achieve a
legitimate law enforcement objective,
(c) Installation pursuant to paragraph (a)(i) and nonconsensual
monitoring pursuant to paragraph (b)(i) shall be permitted only
on written authorization by a judicial officer, except when
obtaining the required court order is not feasible due to exigent
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circumstances, in which case an order should be sought as soon
as practicable. The court order should authorize surveillance
for as long as necessary to achieve the authorized objective(s)
of the surveillance, limited to a maximum of 60 days absent
articulable facts demonstrating a need for longer surveillance.
Extensions of 60 days should be permitted on reauthorization by
a judge under the appropriate standard.
Standard 2-6.5. Illumination and Telescopic Devices
(a) Use of an illumination or telescopic device to observe a
private activity or condition is permissible when:
(i) a judicial officer has issued a warrant on probable
cause to believe evidence of crime will thereby be discov-
ered; or
(ii) obtaining a warrant is not feasible due to exigent
circumstances, and the surveilling officer has probable
cause to believe evidence of crime will thereby be discov-
ered.
(b) Use of an illumination or telescopic device that is not
governed by Standard 2-6.5(a) is permissible when:
(i) the use is overt and not prolonged with respect to any
given area; or
(ii) it is reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective.
Standard 2-6.6. Detection Devices
(a) Use of a detection device to search a private place (whether
associated with a person, premises, or effect) is permissible
when:
(i) the search is on probable cause:
(A) pursuant to a search warrant issued by a judicial
officer; or
(B) without a search warrant when obtaining such a
warrant:
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(1) would not be feasible due to exigent circum-
stances; or
(2) is unnecessary because of the lesser expecta-
tion of privacy associated with the private place; or
(ii) the device is directed only at places the police are
authorized to search:
(A) incident to a lawful custodial arrest;
(B) with the consent of a person with real or apparent
authority to give such consent; or
(C) pursuant to a lawful inventory; or
(iii) upon grounds for such protective action, the device is
directed only at places the police are authorized to:
(A) subject to a protective frisk;
(B) otherwise enter without notice in the interest of
self-protection; or
(C) subject to a protective sweep; or
(iv) the device is directed only at persons or effects passing
a checkpoint, if:
(A) the checkpoint is fixed and has been established to
serve a compelling government interest that no contra-
band pass by that checkpoint, as determined by an
appropriate politically accountable law enforcement
official or governmental authority;
(B) the checkpoint is fixed and has been established to
serve a compelling government interest that no weap-
ons pass by that checkpoint into a place where the
presence of weapons would be extraordinarily hazard-
ous, as determined by an appropriate politically ac-
countable law enforcement official or governmental
authority; or
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(C) the checkpoint is temporary and has been estab-
lished in response to a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily harm, upon a finding made of record by
a supervisory law enforcement official that:
(1) there is a reasonable suspicion that the instru-
mentality threatening such harm or the person or
persons threatened will thereby be discovered; and
(2) the anticipated size of the group of persons
involved is reasonable in light of the purpose for
which the device is to be used; and
(D) with respect to the checkpoints in (A) and (B), the
public to be affected by the checkpoint:
(1) is notified of the intended location of the
checkpoint; and
(2) has the opportunity, both prior to the initiation
of the surveillance and periodically during it, to
express its views about the checkpoint and propose
changes in its execution, through a hearing or
some other appropriate means.
(b) Use of a contraband-specific detection device to search a
private place in circumstances other than those authorized by
Standard 2-6.6(a) is permissible if it does not involve search of
a place of residence and:
(i) such use is reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective; and
(ii) if a seizure is made to facilitate such use, there are
grounds for the seizure.
(c) Use of a weapon-specific detection device is permissible in
the circumstances specified in Standard 2-6.6(a)(iii), even
absent any individualized suspicion of danger that otherwise
would be required.
(d) Law enforcement agencies using detection devices should
adopt procedures:
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(i) to avoid disclosure of gender-specific anatomical
features to officers of the opposite gender; and
(ii) to ensure that no physical harm is caused by such
devices; and
(iii) to ensure that the capabilities of any device used
conform as closely as possible to the authorized objective
or objectives of the surveillance.
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